کثرت‌گرایی بیل و رستال؛ و وحدت‌گرایی حداقلی در مورد منطق

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 پژوهشگر پسادکتری، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران

2 دانشیار فلسفه، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران

چکیده

براساس دیدگاه کثرت‌گرایی در مورد منطق، چندین نظام درست از منطق وجود دارند. در بیشتر قرائت‌هایی که از این دیدگاه وجود دارد، نسبی‌باوری در مورد منطق پذیرفته شده و درستیِ یک نظام از منطق به‌نحوی وابسته به مؤلفه‌ای متمایز از آن نظام منطقی دانسته می‌شود. بیل و رستال اما مدعی ارائۀ تقریری از کثرت‌گرایی هستند که در یک زبان واحد ارائه شده و متضمن قبول نسبی‌باوری در مورد منطق نیست. در مقالۀ حاضر، برخی از مهم‌ترین انواع کثرت‌گرایی را معرفی کرده و نشان می‌دهیم که برخلاف ادعای بیل و رستال، کثرت‌گرایی ایشان اولاً نمی‌تواند در یک زبان واحد ارائه شود؛ ثانیاً متضمن قبول نوعی از نسبی‌باوری در مورد منطق است. بر اساس قبول این نتایج، تلاش می‌کنیم با معرفی دیدگاهی با عنوان «وحدت‌گرایی حداقلی» نشان دهیم که درصورتی‌که کسی بخواهد دیدگاه بیل و رستال را به‌عنوان یک دیدگاه قابل اعتنا در این حوزه در نظر بگیرد، لازم است وحدت‌گرایی حداقلی را بپذیرد.
 

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism and Minimal Monism about Logic

نویسندگان [English]

  • Hamid Alaeinejad 1
  • Morteza Haj Hosseini 2
1 Postdoc Researcher, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran
2 Associate Professor of philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran
چکیده [English]

According to logical pluralism, there are several correct systems of logic. Most types of logical pluralism are based on the acceptance of logical relativism which means that the correctness of a system of logic depends entirely on distinct components of that system. Nevertheless, Beall and Restall claimed that they have proposed a kind of pluralism that is presented in a single language and does not entail accepting relativism. In this article, having introduced some of the most important types of logical pluralism, we tried to show that, contrary to Beall and Restall, their pluralism (i) cannot be presented in a single language; (ii) involves accepting a kind of relativism. Based on these results, we have tried to show that, by introducing a view titled “minimal monism”, if one wants to consider Beall and Restall pluralism as a credible perspective in this area, it is necessary for him to accept minimal monism.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Beall and Restall
  • correct logic
  • monism
  • pluralism
  • relativism
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