عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]چکیده [English]
Ibn Sina Characterizes Sidiqin Argument as an argument by means of which the existence of Necessary Being is proved just on the basis of reflecting on the nature of being. He claims that his versions of the argument satisfy the criterion, really. Mulla Sadra, however, argues first that Ibn Sina’s arguments are not, properly speaking, based on reflecting on the nature of being, and second that they are based on reflecting on the concept of being. Here, we first formalize one of the Ibn Sina’s arguments, namely the version of Najat. Then we argue that based on Ibn Sina’s metaphysical system, Sadra’s objections do not work. Finally, we propose that if one redefines necessary being and contingent being by use of causality, then one reaches to a new version of Ibn Sina’s Sidiqin Argument that dissolves Sadra’s objection.