نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانش‌آموختۀ دکترا، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکدۀ الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.
2 دانش‌آموختۀ دکترا، گروه فلسفۀ دین، پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
The rationality of religious beliefs has been a central topic in philosophical inquiry throughout history. Recently, two prominent epistemologists, John Greco and Linda Zagzebski, have defended this rationality within the framework of the epistemology of testimony. Greco, through his general anti-reductionist approach, asserts that religious knowledge is transmitted to recipients via reliable channels of transmission. Zagzebski, on the other hand, argues for the rationality of religious belief by justifying religious authority through a conscientious, self-reflective trust in others—a trust that stems from trust in oneself, which she presents as a deliberative reason. In this paper, we critically analyze the views of Greco and Zagzebski, alongside Jennifer Lackey, to demonstrate the inadequacies in their arguments. Specifically, we aim to critique these two thinkers by examining the logical implications of their positions, ultimately showing that their arguments for the rationality of religious belief are not valid. We identify three key issues with Greco’s perspective: (1) it fails to eliminate the influence of epistemic luck; (2) it does not adequately apply to fundamental religious beliefs, which are essential for participation in religious communities; and (3) it encounters the "garbage problem," which remains unresolved. Similarly, we highlight three problems in Zagzebski’s view: (1) her approach could classify the beliefs of communities such as terrorists and racists as rational; (2) it necessitates accepting the testimony of authority figures even when they are clearly erroneous; and (3) deliberative reasons are insufficient in addressing significant issues. Therefore, attempting to prove the rationality of religious belief through the epistemology of testimony, at least as proposed by Greco and Zagzebski, leads to a dead end.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
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