نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
استادیار، گروه کلام، مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفۀ ایران، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
Evidentialism posits that the epistemic value of propositions lies in their evidence. However, alternative approaches, independent of evidential support, have emerged to maintain validity when competing viewpoints falter. This phenomenon, often termed "epistemic presumption," serves as both a procedural starting point and occasionally holds substantive truth-value. In discussions surrounding the existence of God, differing presumptions—whether theism, atheism, or non-belief—are contentious. Theists and atheists assert positive claims necessitating evidence, while agnostics posit that both positions lack support, contingent upon evidence provision. Thus, the burden of proof rests upon all three perspectives.
کلیدواژهها [English]