نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
دانشآموختۀ دکترا، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکدۀ الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
The philosophy of mathematics in the Islamic intellectual tradition is both rich and sophisticated. Like his predecessor Avicenna, who engaged extensively with central problems in the philosophy of mathematics, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī addressed many of these issues and introduced new ones of his own. The aim of this article is to substantiate this claim. Employing an analytical approach, it argues that Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, in the full sense of the term, developed a distinct philosophy of mathematics. Al-Ṭūsī’s principal contributions to the ontology of mathematics are twofold. First, he refuted arguments for finitism—specifically the arguments from collimation and mapping. Second, he analyzed the properties of infinity, arguing that the infinite admits of comparison in terms of “less” and “more.” His contributions to the epistemology of mathematics are likewise significant. First, unlike Avicenna but in line with Ibn al-Haytham, he defended a form of empiricism with respect to mathematical propositions, just as he had defended empiricism regarding mathematical concepts, albeit within an Avicennian framework. Second, he raised the problem of mathematical truth: how mathematical propositions can be true despite being composed of secondary intelligibles that lack external instantiation, while remaining universal, veridical, and applicable to both actualized and non-actualized individuals. In response, al-Ṭūsī proposed an alternative account of truth and advanced his innovative theory of nafs al-amr.
کلیدواژهها [English]
)