Physicalism, as one of the dominant paradigms in contemporary philosophy of mind, maintains that consciousness is entirely dependent upon the neural structures and physiological processes of the brain. Accordingly, all forms of sensory perception are regarded as products of neural activity. Within this framework, visual perception is considered impossible in the absence of an intact visual system and a functioning visual cortex. However, reports of near-death experiences (NDEs) in blind individuals—particularly those who are congenitally blind—have raised significant questions concerning the explanatory adequacy of this account. The central question addressed in this study is how individuals who have never possessed visual experience can nevertheless report vivid, detailed, and in some cases veridical perceptions during conditions in which brain activity is severely impaired or apparently absent. Employing a descriptive-analytical methodology, this study evaluates the phenomenon through the combined use of empirical research on near-death experiences and philosophical analysis within the philosophy of mind. The findings indicate that several well-documented reports from congenitally blind individuals resist straightforward explanation in terms of standard physicalist accounts, including hypoxia-induced hallucinations, memory reconstruction, and neurophysiological disturbances. At the very least, these cases reveal an explanatory gap within reductive physicalism. At the same time, this paper argues that such evidence should not be regarded as conclusive proof of any specific non-physicalist theory. Rather, its principal philosophical significance lies in exposing the explanatory limitations of certain reductive formulations of physicalism. Consequently, near-death experiences in the blind provide an important basis for reconsidering the relationship between mind and brain and for fostering renewed dialogue among the philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and philosophy of religion.