نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسنده English
The theory of i'tibariyat or “Enactive cognitions” by the late Allama Tabataba'i was an innovative theory in epistemology and rational psychology with implications for such fields as logic, jurisprudence and principles of jurisprudence, ethics, law, social sciences and theology. It's been also a subject of ongoing debates and discussions to date. Given that close to a century has passed since its introduction, a full appraisal of the theory seems imperative. My goal is examining the critical responses over this period in the hope of certifying the validity of the theory and its application in various fields. The outcome, I surmise, far from rejection of the theory is refinement and consolidation of its general framework. In this paper, I start by providing a historical background and a list of key issues raised against the theory. Then, I focus on two of them for the present paper. I address a logical issue raised about the criterial status of the modal “ought” proposed by Allam for identifying Enactive cognitions, and reinforce a literal interpretation which overcomes the objection. Then I deal with a major issue concerning the general postulation of i'tibar in voluntary actions, the very bedrock of the theory. By inspiration from Allama’s own passages, I resolve the crucial objection by rejecting necessity of formal i'tibar in actions and dividing general i’tbar into implicit and formal types so that either type would be sufficient for voluntary actions.
کلیدواژهها English
