نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
استادیار، گروه آموزش معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه فرهنگیان، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Abu Ali al-Jubbaʾi, in addition to the three well-known conditions of knowledge as justified true belief, proposed two further conditions: (4) the reliability of the cognitive process and (5) the no-defeater (indefeasibility) condition. The fourth condition concerns the reliability of the belief-forming process and closely parallels contemporary Reliabilism, which emphasizes the acquisition of belief through dependable cognitive faculties. The fifth condition corresponds to a form of logical consistency or defeasibility requirement; however, given al-Jubbaʾi’s retention of the strong condition of truth, the addition of a defeasibility criterion may initially appear redundant. Nevertheless, this condition closely aligns with the Defeasibility Theory developed by Lehrer and Paxson. Al-Jubbaʾi also objected to Abu al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllaf’s emphasis on epistemic accessibility, arguing that one may possess knowledge without being able to articulate a supporting argument. The convergence of his views with Reliabilism and Defeasibility Theory, together with his rejection of the accessibility requirement, clearly situates al-Jubbaʾi within the framework of Epistemic Externalism. Examining the works of Muslim theologians through contemporary epistemological frameworks reveals a rich and sophisticated tradition of philosophical inquiry that remains highly relevant to modern epistemological debates.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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