نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه فیزیک، گروه فلسفۀ مضاف، دانشکده فلسفه و اخلاق، دانشگاه باقرالعلوم (ع)، قم، ایران.
2 دانشیار، گروه فلسفۀ علم و فنآوری، دانشکدۀ علوم پایه، دانشگاه جامع امام حسین (ع)، تهران، ایران.
3 استاد، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکدۀ فلسفه و اخلاق، دانشگاه باقرالعلوم (ع)، قم، ایران.
4 استاد، گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه مفید، قم، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
This paper adopts an analytical-comparative method to examine the foundations of the Fundamentality of Quiddity and the Fundamentality of Existence in Islamic philosophy, with particular attention to the objective form of secondary philosophical intelligibles (existence, contingency, unity) and logical categories (genus, differentia). Suhrawardī and Mīrdāmād, as the founders of the former school, deny an independent objective form to these categories on the grounds of the impossibility of infinite regress. They regard existence merely as the "realization of quiddity," considering quiddity as the sole authentic reality. Consequently, external reality is viewed as a "mixed single object," and these categories are deemed mental considerations. This approach, however, faces a challenge in explaining the correspondence between mind and reality. In contrast, Mullā Ṣadrā, emphasizing the Fundamentality of Existence, conceives existence as a unitary, simple, and graded reality that constitutes the authentic objective form. By distinguishing between "concrete attribution"— in which both subject and attribute have independent objective forms—and "abstractive attribution"—in which the attribute lacks a separate objective form—he explains mind–reality correspondence based on the unity of existence. The paper concludes that disagreement over the independent objective form of these philosophical concepts lies at the core of the divergence between these schools regarding the structure of reality and the criterion of truth.
کلیدواژهها [English]
)