نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 استادیار، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکدۀ الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه ایلام، ایلام، ایران.
2 استاد، گروه فلسفه، موسسۀ آموزشی و پژوهشی امام خمینی، قم، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
The distinction between existence and quiddity, as well as the link between the two, has been a substantial issue in Islamic philosophy throughout history, having profound effects on other issues. Muslim philosophers argue that contingent beings possess both existence and quiddity in its narrow sense. However, many philosophers believe that Necessary Being (Wājib al-Wujūd) is devoid of quiddity and some deny the quiddity-based reality. Nonetheless, logical reasoning indicates that all ranks of the essence of things (including real and constructed (i‘tibārī), as well as existential and non-existential) are predicated on quiddity. Hence, first and foremost, it is not impossible to put forward an integrated analysis of existence and quiddity for Necessary Being, where quiddity, like existence, is limitless. Second, the copula notions (ma‘ānī rabaṭī) are quiddity-based, even if their quiddity, like their existence, is the quiddity for others. Third, non-existent matters are, in fact, distinct from one another. For example, while the non-existence of a vicious circle and a giant (ghūl) is the same in that they are both non-existent, their distinction stems from their adherence to their quiddity (the whatness of a vicious circle and a giant (ghūl). Fourth, constructed matters (umūr i‘tibārī) are similarly quiddity-based, though their quiddity, like their existence, is constructed (i‘tibārī). As a result, the property of being quiddity-based elevates to an existent qua existent axiom, becoming a direct accident comparable to reality.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
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