نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسنده English
Awareness of human fallibility raises a fundamental question: Can religious beliefs remain epistemically justified, or does the possibility of rational error undermine their epistemic standing? Using an analytical-critical method and the theory of epistemic defeaters, this study evaluates an argument that moves from awareness of rational fallibility to the collapse of reason-based justification for religious beliefs. It combines contemporary epistemic analysis with a rereading of rational authority in Imami theological texts. The findings show that the collapse argument conflates three levels: the general possibility of error, an actual defeater in a particular case, and the global unreliability of reason. Fallibility disrupts a belief’s justificatory status only when specific and relevant evidence indicates a malfunction in the belief-forming process at issue. General awareness of cognitive limitation has no such effect, while a global denial of rational authority weakens the rational basis of that denial itself. Imami rational theology therefore supports a model of “limited but reliable reason.” Reason derives its authority not from infallibility or self-sufficiency, but from ordinary reliability, correctability, and a complementary relationship with revelation. This model reconciles critical rationality with epistemically responsible religious commitment.
کلیدواژهها English
