The aim of this research is to conduct a comparative study of two epistemological models in explaining how sensory perception emerges: the theory of "common sense" (al-ḥiss al-mushtarak) in the philosophy of al-Fārābī and Avicenna, and the theory of the "lived body" in the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The central question is whether sensory perception is a staged, analysable, and representational process or a holistic, pre-reflective phenomenon rooted in the lived interaction of the body with the world. Employing a comparative-analytical approach based on a close reading of primary philosophical texts—including the works of al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and Merleau-Ponty—this study compares the ontological foundations, mechanism of perception, origin of meaning, and the feasibility of simulating cognition in these two intellectual systems. The findings show that al-Fārābī and Avicenna view perception as an ascending progression from sensory passivity to rational actuality, in which the body serves as a passive instrument for the soul and common sense assumes the role of integrating dispersed data. Conversely, Merleau-Ponty, by critiquing subject-object dualism and rejecting raw sensory data, introduces perception as intertwined with the "flesh of the world" and considers it to lack an algorithmic equivalent. While both perspectives share an emphasis on the unity of perception, they diverge regarding the ontological status of the body, the origin of meaning, and the possibility of algorithmic modeling. In conclusion, human perception is a multilayered phenomenon, and its comprehensive explanation requires the simultaneous acceptance of two dimensions: staged analysability according to the theory of common sense to explain higher levels of cognition, and lived holism according to the phenomenology of the lived body to explain the pre-reflective layer of perception. This integration can open new horizons in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and the design of artificial intelligence systems.