نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
استادیار، گروه فلسفه و حکمت اسلامی، دانشکدۀ الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
The terms dhāt (essence), dhātī (essential), and the qualificative expression bi l dhāt (per se), along with their related concepts, are among the most frequently employed notions in Islamic logic and philosophy. Across the various schools of Islamic thought, these terms have been used in multiple lexical and technical senses. While in some contexts a clear distinction among these meanings has been carefully maintained, in other cases such distinctions lack sufficient clarity. As a result, certain usages carry implicit connotations and conceptual residues of the doctrine of the primacy of quiddity. Although this poses no difficulty within philosophical systems that do not endorse the primacy of existence—and indeed remains fully compatible with quiddity based metaphysics—it becomes deeply problematic once the primacy of existence is adopted as the foundational principle of a philosophical system. Employing an analytical method through a close reading of classical discussions among Muslim philosophers on this issue, and by critically examining and evaluating these positions, the present study argues that the terms dhāt, dhātī, and the qualificative bi l dhāt are remnants of a quiddity based mode of thought—an epistemic and metaphysical paradigm that has been superseded. The paper further presents textual and conceptual evidence in support of this claim, which is discussed in a differentiated manner throughout the study. Ultimately, it is argued that the formulation and continued use of these terms—particularly within an existentialist philosophical framework, and especially in Transcendent Philosophy (al Ḥikma al Mutaʿāliyah)—require critical reassessment, and that a linguistic and conceptual revision is necessary for their appropriate employment.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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