Theology and Probability(A Case Study and Conditional Defense)

Document Type : Research Paper


Associate professor in philosophy and Islamic theology, University of Isfahan,


This article includes an interaction between Theology and Probability. One of the most significant criticisms of Atheistic Naturalism is the Bayesian theorem which argues through probabilities. This argument includes two main ideas: First, the probability of reliability of cognitive faculties 1 (P(R)=1). Second, the reliability of these faculties in a combination of naturalism and evolution (P(R/N&E)) is low or inscrutable. The advocates of Atheistic Naturalism have criticized this argument: 1. The low P(R/N&E) is not a reason to reject R. 2. If defeating of R by evolutionary Naturalism means abandoning the beliefs to anything including evolutionary Naturalism itself, we have a conclusion beyond defeating the R. 3. The existence of sufficient and independent evidence for R, eliminates self-defeating of N&E. To defend this argument against the criticisms, there are some points and additions: 1. The probability value of P(R/N&E) is not merely low but is low or inscrutable. 2. There are some misunderstandings about defeating of R. 3. There isn't sufficient evidence for R, because it's a cognitive agent. The purpose of the paper is to defend the Bayesian theorem against the critiques of evolutionary naturalism in an analytical, complementary, and critical approach.


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