Phenomenal Conservatism: Epistemic Justification by Seemings

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 PhD Candidate in Philosophy of Religion at University of Tehran

2 Associate professor at university of Tehran

3 Professor at University of Tehran;

Abstract

Phenomenal Conservatism is an approach to epistemological justification that, based on "appearances" and "seemings" and in line with the theory of common sense epistemology, attempt to set up an internal and non-inferential justification, at least for some kind of beliefs. According to this view, justification and non-justification have a direct relationship with the mental state of the agent. Based on this assumption that “Things are as they seem”, phenomenal conservatism offers its central idea that if, for an agent, something seems to be true -and there is no defeater for that until doubting in - that agent thereby has at least some justification for believing that. In this article, we will interpret this new approach with an empathetic attitude and, in addition to explaining its main components, we will effort to answer the most important objections of phenomenal conservatism and show that this view is a significant approach to the justification and rationality of human beliefs.

Keywords

References

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Philosophy and Kalam
Volume 54, Issue 2
February 2022
Pages 371-351

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