From Interpersonal Context of Reasons to Internalism: Critical Remarks

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 PhD candidate, Philosophy Department, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

2 . Professor, Philosophy Department, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

In her 2014 paper "Internalism About Reasons: Sad But True?", Kate Manne defends a version of Internalism about normative reasons for actions. She starts by considering the interpersonal context of reasons to emphasize how reasons are limited by psychological states of the agent. Then, she defends a necessary condition for reasons; i.e., Ideal Reasoning Thesis, which every theory of reason should satisfy. However, she claims, externalism fails to do so. On the contrary, we suggest that it is not clear whether the process of Ideal Reasoning happens in an ideal or non-ideal time. Furthermore, it seems preferable to take time to be ideal too. Clearing the ambiguity about time makes externalism able to satisfy Ideal Reasoning Thesis and, thus, the argument for internalism fails.

Keywords

References

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Philosophy and Kalam
Volume 52, Issue 2
January 2020
Pages 169-188

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