A Critical Review of Christopher Franklin’s Solution in Ensurance and Rollback Formulation of the “Problem of Luck”

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Lecturer, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

2 MA Student, Department of Philosophy of Religion, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

Abstract

The main issue of this research is to examine Christopher Franklin's solution to Ensurance and Rollback formulation of Luck, and its purpose is to criticize this solution and show the ineffectiveness of his answer in a descriptive-analytical way. According to the problem of luck, the negation of determinism in the creation of an action leads to luck, and its requirement is the negation of free will. Franklin, who is one of the supporters of event-based causation, offers four formulations of this problem. Negation of determinism in Ensurance formulation leads to unguaranteed action and in the Rollback formulation, leads to the failure to predict the occurrence of an action at the moment of its occurrence. Franklin's answer is based on recognizing the proper location of indeterminism in the process leading to free action. According to him, by placing indeterminism at the moment of the basic action, the two formulations of luck can be solved. According to this interpretation, the agent's reasons, including his desires, goals and emotions, are the cause of free action. In this research, it is revealed that the indeterministic causality of the agent's reasons for free action, which is considered the central core of Franklin's view, is exactly where it leads to the randomness of free action, and as a result, the problem of luck remains valid.

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References

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Philosophy and Kalam
Volume 56, Issue 2
March 2024
Pages 333-349

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