A Comparative Study of Saul Kripke and Allameh Tabatabaei’s Views on the Theory of Reference and the Individual Essence

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 PhD Student in Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology, Shiraz University

2 Associate Professor, Shiraz university, Faculty of Theology:

Abstract

Believing in the individual essence of things, as an ontological issue, has its roots in Greek philosophers’ views. Aristotelian essentialism proves essential attributes for objects, according to which, the essence of the objects depends on their attributes. If such features change, objects will perish. Implementing his reference theory, Kripke shows that proper names are rigid designators, i.e.; their referents are fixed in all possible worlds, or, in these referents, there is something that remains constant in all cases. This results in proving the individual essence of things.
Comparing Kripke’s and Allameh’s views, as well as using an analytical-comparative method, we try to clarify the essentialism in the frameworks provided by Analytical Philosophy and Islamic Philosophy regarding Kripke’s and Allameh Tabatabaie’s views.
According to Allameh, Individual essence comes into existence through essentialism in Islamic tradition. Allameh and Kripke’s views are similar in the Individual essence of objects; however, because of belonging to two different tradition of philosophy, they disagree in other fundamental aspects.

Keywords


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