A Defense of Psychologism about the Nature of Evidence

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Ph.D. Student of Philosophy, Farabi Pardis, University of Tehran

2 Associate Professor, Farabi Pardis, University of Tehran

Abstract

One of the important concepts in epistemology is the that of evidence. Evidence is a kind of reason that is indicative of the truth of the proposition that is the object of one’s doxastic attitude. In this paper, we assess the nature of evidence. There are three important views on the nature of evidence: psychologism, factive propositionalism and non-factive propositionalism. After explaining and assessing the arguments for the three views, we come to the conclusion that the arguments for psychologism is stronger than the ones for propositionalism. So, it seems that the evidence is one’s non-factive mental states.

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References

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Philosophy and Kalam
Volume 52, Issue 1
June 2019
Pages 37-56

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