Exploring the Compatibility of Faith and Inquiry within the Framework of Howard-Snyder’s View

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 PhD Student, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

2 Professor, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

3 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

This article addresses the apparent conflict between religious faith and inquiry. At the heart of this tension lies an incompatibility: belief requires commitment, whereas inquiry involves questioning and the suspension of judgment. Dominant approaches in the epistemology of religion, which are largely doxastic, typically define faith as belief in religious propositions. On these accounts, faith and inquiry are seemingly incompatible. However, the historical coexistence of faith and inquiry among religious thinkers and philosophers suggests otherwise. Drawing on conceptual analysis and Daniel Howard-Snyder’s non-doxastic account, this study argues that conceiving of faith as beliefless assuming—a cognitive attitude similar to belief—can resolve the conflict. The article’s contribution lies in offering a framework that distinguishes faith from belief, while incorporating Jane Friedman’s concept of the interrogative attitude and Michael Palmira’s hypothesis-based approach. This framework enables religious believers to actively engage in rational inquiry. The findings indicate that this approach not only offers a theoretical resolution to the faith-inquiry conflict, but also yields practical implications for science-religion dialogue and the methodology of religious studies.

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References

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Philosophy and Kalam
Volume 58, Issue 2
Autumn & Winter 2025/2026
February 2026
Pages 347-367

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