University of TehranPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942246120130321Mysticism of Ibn Sina
in the French Works of Two Recent DecadesMysticism of Ibn Sina
in the French Works of Two Recent Decades1213193410.22059/jitp.2013.31934FAMohebbaliAbsalanAssistant Professor, University of Sistan & BaluchestanJournal Article20120501In the nineteenth century, with the rise of the literary schools<br />in France and giving heed to oriental literacy and mystical<br />works, the commentators and translators of Ibn Sina began to<br />work on his treatises. Since they knew Ibn Sina as an<br />Aristotelian philosopher, the following question was raised:<br />Why has Aristotelian Ibn Sina given heed to mystical<br />attitudes? In response to the question whether or not there is<br />any unity between the two mentioned tendencies, the French<br />researchers have three views: Some have attempted to find a<br />sort of relationship between Ibn Sina's philosophical writings<br />and his mystical works. Others have not questioned his<br />mystical character and his spiritual works and have clearly<br />pointed out that his intuitions and mystical words has a sort of<br />metaphorical and mysterious theme showing his mystical<br />experiences. The rest have introduced him as an Aristotelian<br />philosopher who has only quoted the words of Sufis and<br />mystics. Our goal in this paper is to critically analyze these<br />three perspectives.In the nineteenth century, with the rise of the literary schools<br />in France and giving heed to oriental literacy and mystical<br />works, the commentators and translators of Ibn Sina began to<br />work on his treatises. Since they knew Ibn Sina as an<br />Aristotelian philosopher, the following question was raised:<br />Why has Aristotelian Ibn Sina given heed to mystical<br />attitudes? In response to the question whether or not there is<br />any unity between the two mentioned tendencies, the French<br />researchers have three views: Some have attempted to find a<br />sort of relationship between Ibn Sina's philosophical writings<br />and his mystical works. Others have not questioned his<br />mystical character and his spiritual works and have clearly<br />pointed out that his intuitions and mystical words has a sort of<br />metaphorical and mysterious theme showing his mystical<br />experiences. The rest have introduced him as an Aristotelian<br />philosopher who has only quoted the words of Sufis and<br />mystics. Our goal in this paper is to critically analyze these<br />three perspectives.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_31934_b955572de898e619f4250f2c0c2cb4e0.pdfUniversity of TehranPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942246120130321A Study of Condensation and Rarefaction
phenomena in Islamic natural philosophy (physics)A Study of Condensation and Rarefaction
phenomena in Islamic natural philosophy (physics)23533193510.22059/jitp.2013.31935FASaeedAnvariResponsible Author, Assistant Professor, Islamic Philosophy and
Theology, Allame Tabatabaee University.AbbasAnvariFull professor, Institute of Physics, Sharif university of TechnologyJournal Article20120529Condensation (contraction) and rarefaction (expansion)<br />are two terms in natural philosophy (physics) used in<br />several different meanings. In this article the meanings of<br />the two terms and their real and artificial kinds are<br />introduced and their differences with some terms such as<br />growth, tumor, and, also, their opposite ones are<br />expressed. We have also evaluated the philosophical and<br />experimental arguments offered by Islamic Peripatetic<br />philosophers for the real condensation and rarefaction<br />from the perspective of modern science. Finally we have<br />shown that although there are some criticisms against their<br />arguments, the Islamic Peripatetic philosophers have been<br />realistic in describing these terms, and the opponents’<br />words such as Suhrawardi’s are not correct.Condensation (contraction) and rarefaction (expansion)<br />are two terms in natural philosophy (physics) used in<br />several different meanings. In this article the meanings of<br />the two terms and their real and artificial kinds are<br />introduced and their differences with some terms such as<br />growth, tumor, and, also, their opposite ones are<br />expressed. We have also evaluated the philosophical and<br />experimental arguments offered by Islamic Peripatetic<br />philosophers for the real condensation and rarefaction<br />from the perspective of modern science. Finally we have<br />shown that although there are some criticisms against their<br />arguments, the Islamic Peripatetic philosophers have been<br />realistic in describing these terms, and the opponents’<br />words such as Suhrawardi’s are not correct.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_31935_93af1b4f8fd04dc95d610b28dac2a3e1.pdfUniversity of TehranPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942246120130321Neo-Sadraean Epistemology and the Divider of the
"Imagination" and "Judgment"Neo-Sadraean Epistemology and the Divider of the
"Imagination" and "Judgment"55773193610.22059/jitp.2013.31936FAAbd-al -HoseinKhosropanahResponsible Author: Associate Professor, Iranian Institute of Philosophy,
Tehran, Iran.MahdiAshooriMA Student in Islamic Philosophy and Kalam, Payame Noor University,
Tehran, IranJournal Article20120520Differentiation of the two terms imagination and judgment<br />is a main distinction in Islamic logic and Neo-Sadraean<br />epistemology. Both disciplines believe that the divider of<br />the two is "acquired knowledge". But, the concept of<br />“judgment”, in epistemology, is not the same as the<br />concept of "acquired knowledge" in Islamic philosophy.<br />Differentiation of imagination and judgment is an<br />ontological one, and Islamic philosophers consider<br />acquired knowledge as an "epistemic being". In logic and<br />epistemology "Judgment" is the same as "proposition",<br />and is not an “epistemic being". “Judgment" is the origin<br />of the two concepts: "representation" and "assertion". In<br />logic, "Judgment" is "asserting the truth of a proposition",<br />and in epistemology, it is the knowledge of realization or<br />non- realization of something.Differentiation of the two terms imagination and judgment<br />is a main distinction in Islamic logic and Neo-Sadraean<br />epistemology. Both disciplines believe that the divider of<br />the two is "acquired knowledge". But, the concept of<br />“judgment”, in epistemology, is not the same as the<br />concept of "acquired knowledge" in Islamic philosophy.<br />Differentiation of imagination and judgment is an<br />ontological one, and Islamic philosophers consider<br />acquired knowledge as an "epistemic being". In logic and<br />epistemology "Judgment" is the same as "proposition",<br />and is not an “epistemic being". “Judgment" is the origin<br />of the two concepts: "representation" and "assertion". In<br />logic, "Judgment" is "asserting the truth of a proposition",<br />and in epistemology, it is the knowledge of realization or<br />non- realization of something.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_31936_78283ccab5c9a60e46cdb0aaf00a87f4.pdfUniversity of TehranPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942246120130321The Mulla Sadra’s Distinct Solution from Ibn Sina’s on Resolving Co-existence of Two Categories in Mental Existence and Its EfficiencyThe Mulla Sadra’s Distinct Solution from Ibn Sina’s on Resolving Co-existence of Two Categories in Mental Existence and Its Efficiency79913193710.22059/jitp.2013.31937FAMahmudZeraatpisheAssistant Professor, University of BirjandAhad FaramarzQharamalekiProf. University of TehranJournal Article20110618Although Aristotle has considered the “universal substance” as a substance, he introduced knowledge as an accident. The question then arises as to whether a “universal substance”, whereas it is a substance, can be an accident. Answering the question, Ibn Sina has changed the subject of the dispute from “mental substance” to “quiddity of substance”, so that he could guarantee its truth in the form of an “essential artificial common predication” (haml shaye sana’i be-al-dhdhat). Considering this change and criticizing Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra has posed “essential primary predication” (haml awwali dhdhati) as a solution. By considering these two solutions, the necessity of posing essential primary predication by Sadra can be understood. It also can be well realized that their solutions, despite Qawam Safari’s claim, are not the same, and Sadra’s solution cannot be seen as inefficient, as Fallahi says, although it can only solves some part of the problem.Although Aristotle has considered the “universal substance” as a substance, he introduced knowledge as an accident. The question then arises as to whether a “universal substance”, whereas it is a substance, can be an accident. Answering the question, Ibn Sina has changed the subject of the dispute from “mental substance” to “quiddity of substance”, so that he could guarantee its truth in the form of an “essential artificial common predication” (haml shaye sana’i be-al-dhdhat). Considering this change and criticizing Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra has posed “essential primary predication” (haml awwali dhdhati) as a solution. By considering these two solutions, the necessity of posing essential primary predication by Sadra can be understood. It also can be well realized that their solutions, despite Qawam Safari’s claim, are not the same, and Sadra’s solution cannot be seen as inefficient, as Fallahi says, although it can only solves some part of the problem.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_31937_05e6f33f3e4e84fd0765685319a55000.pdfUniversity of TehranPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942246120130321Khunaji’s Tautologies in Second-Order LogicKhunaji’s Tautologies in Second-Order Logic931123193810.22059/jitp.2013.31938FAAsadollahFallahiAssistant Professor, Iranian Institute of PhilosophyJournal Article20121024For the first time in the history of logic, Afzal al-Din al-Khunaji has found tautologies and contradictories among the verity and actuality propositions. These have been formalized and investigated in First-Order Logic and it has been shown that their perpetual truth requires the assumption of ‘the presupposed existence of non-existence.’ In this paper, I investigate the tautologies in Second-Order Logic and show that there is no need to the aforementioned assumption, and they can be proved as theorems without any assumption in Second-Order Logic. But, the analysis of these tautologies in Second-Order Logic has its shortcomings; for example, the formalization of actuality I-propositions in many cases is contradictory. This shows that the analysis of the tautologies, whether in First- or Second-Order Logic, has shortcomings, which need to be removed.For the first time in the history of logic, Afzal al-Din al-Khunaji has found tautologies and contradictories among the verity and actuality propositions. These have been formalized and investigated in First-Order Logic and it has been shown that their perpetual truth requires the assumption of ‘the presupposed existence of non-existence.’ In this paper, I investigate the tautologies in Second-Order Logic and show that there is no need to the aforementioned assumption, and they can be proved as theorems without any assumption in Second-Order Logic. But, the analysis of these tautologies in Second-Order Logic has its shortcomings; for example, the formalization of actuality I-propositions in many cases is contradictory. This shows that the analysis of the tautologies, whether in First- or Second-Order Logic, has shortcomings, which need to be removed.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_31938_5f4f199913a2caff854f473c1cdba01f.pdfUniversity of TehranPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942246120130321On Zalta on Anselm’s Ontological ArgumentOn Zalta on Anselm’s Ontological Argument1131313193910.22059/jitp.2013.31939FAHamedGhadiriResponsible Author: MA in, Tarbiat Modares UniversityDavoodHosseiniAssistant Professor, Tarbiat Modares UniversityJournal Article20121015Oppenheimer and Zalta, in a co-Authored paper, argue that the Anselm’s ontological argument can be formalized based on free logic and the concept of conceivability. According to their version, there are only two premises in Anselm’s argument. We will argue that one can extend their formalization by introducing an argument for one of the two premises based on Anselm’s text. We will also show that our formulation is in more accordance with Anselm’s text.Oppenheimer and Zalta, in a co-Authored paper, argue that the Anselm’s ontological argument can be formalized based on free logic and the concept of conceivability. According to their version, there are only two premises in Anselm’s argument. We will argue that one can extend their formalization by introducing an argument for one of the two premises based on Anselm’s text. We will also show that our formulation is in more accordance with Anselm’s text.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_31939_0f2316f5c0eeb842caeb68a5b893dfa9.pdfUniversity of TehranPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942246120130321The Foundations and Consequences of
Suhrawardi’s Theory of ImaginationThe Foundations and Consequences of
Suhrawardi’s Theory of Imagination1331463194010.22059/jitp.2013.31940FANadiaMaftouniAssistant Professor of Islamic Philosophy and Kalam, University of
Tehran.Journal Article20110611The problem of “imagination”, as raised by Muslim<br />philosophers, has several epistemic consequences in<br />subjects as diverse as ontology, prophecy,<br />conceptualization and the functions of art. In<br />Illuminationist Philosophy of Suhrawardi, moreover, bears<br />the topic of imagination a correlation to other subjects. Of<br />the foundations of Suhrawardi's processing of the theory<br />of imagination, the most prominent is the principle of<br />vision, which he has developed in some positions, and<br />based on which he has considered imagination as the<br />illumination of the soul. Apart from intuitive proofs,<br />Suhrawardi's major argument for illumationist imagination<br />is the refutation of manifold cognitive faculties. It is based<br />on this refutation that he devotes an echelon of the<br />universe to suspended archetypes (incorporeal forms). He<br />rejects the affinity between sensual and imaginative<br />perception.The problem of “imagination”, as raised by Muslim<br />philosophers, has several epistemic consequences in<br />subjects as diverse as ontology, prophecy,<br />conceptualization and the functions of art. In<br />Illuminationist Philosophy of Suhrawardi, moreover, bears<br />the topic of imagination a correlation to other subjects. Of<br />the foundations of Suhrawardi's processing of the theory<br />of imagination, the most prominent is the principle of<br />vision, which he has developed in some positions, and<br />based on which he has considered imagination as the<br />illumination of the soul. Apart from intuitive proofs,<br />Suhrawardi's major argument for illumationist imagination<br />is the refutation of manifold cognitive faculties. It is based<br />on this refutation that he devotes an echelon of the<br />universe to suspended archetypes (incorporeal forms). He<br />rejects the affinity between sensual and imaginative<br />perception.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_31940_dcdd83022e8291b04e248cb552704d4a.pdf