Univrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258220250819Propositions Refractory to the Theory of Predication in the Thought of Seyed Ṣadr al-Dīn DashtakīPropositions Refractory to the Theory of Predication in the Thought of Seyed Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtakī31934110326310.22059/jitp.2025.393746.523601FAAhmadHosseiniAssistant Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250419The theory of predication seeks to explain predicative propositions, each of which rests on certain principles. While these principles account for some propositions, they encounter difficulties in explaining others. Dashtakī refers to two theories of predication within the Islamic philosophical–logical tradition, contending that both are incapable of explaining certain kinds of propositions. In my view, the problematic propositions for these theories can be classified into ten categories, which I call “propositions that the theory of predication cannot explain.” According to Dashtakī, earlier theories of predication attempted to integrate the attributes of the subject or predicate into the theory itself—a move that ultimately undermined their explanatory power. He therefore formulated a new theory of predication, incorporating specific elements to address these challenging propositions. The denial of relationality, the theory of the indeterminacy of the derived term (mushtaq), and a particular reading of the far‘iyya rule—each consistent with his theory of predication—enable him to tackle these issues. Propositions such as al-insān mawjud (“man exists”) are among the most problematic. Accepting relationality (nisba) within the theory of predication leads to an inevitable duality between “man” and “existence” in external reality; the conventional theory of the derived term regards “existence” as abstracted from man only when actual existence is established for him; and the rule known as far‘iyya requires the prior existence of man. In this article, while presenting my interpretation of Dashtakī’s theory and its components, I demonstrate how this theory aims to explain challenging propositions such as al-insān mawjud. In Dashtakī’s view, previous theories of predication suffered from a fundamental flaw: they incorporated the specifics of the subject or predicate into the theoretical framework itself, thereby rendering them unable to account for certain propositions.The theory of predication seeks to explain predicative propositions, each of which rests on certain principles. While these principles account for some propositions, they encounter difficulties in explaining others. Dashtakī refers to two theories of predication within the Islamic philosophical–logical tradition, contending that both are incapable of explaining certain kinds of propositions. In my view, the problematic propositions for these theories can be classified into ten categories, which I call “propositions that the theory of predication cannot explain.” According to Dashtakī, earlier theories of predication attempted to integrate the attributes of the subject or predicate into the theory itself—a move that ultimately undermined their explanatory power. He therefore formulated a new theory of predication, incorporating specific elements to address these challenging propositions. The denial of relationality, the theory of the indeterminacy of the derived term (mushtaq), and a particular reading of the far‘iyya rule—each consistent with his theory of predication—enable him to tackle these issues. Propositions such as al-insān mawjud (“man exists”) are among the most problematic. Accepting relationality (nisba) within the theory of predication leads to an inevitable duality between “man” and “existence” in external reality; the conventional theory of the derived term regards “existence” as abstracted from man only when actual existence is established for him; and the rule known as far‘iyya requires the prior existence of man. In this article, while presenting my interpretation of Dashtakī’s theory and its components, I demonstrate how this theory aims to explain challenging propositions such as al-insān mawjud. In Dashtakī’s view, previous theories of predication suffered from a fundamental flaw: they incorporated the specifics of the subject or predicate into the theoretical framework itself, thereby rendering them unable to account for certain propositions.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_103263_05767c7f4da1d85f0f1935226ba9126d.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258220250819Exploring the Compatibility of Faith and Inquiry within the Framework of Howard-Snyder’s ViewExploring the Compatibility of Faith and Inquiry within the Framework of Howard-Snyder’s View34736710326410.22059/jitp.2025.394811.523609FAMahbobehPakdelPhD Student, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranAbbasYazdaniProfessor, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranMohammadrezaBayatAssociate Professor, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250510This article addresses the apparent conflict between religious faith and inquiry. At the heart of this tension lies an incompatibility: belief requires commitment, whereas inquiry involves questioning and the suspension of judgment. Dominant approaches in the epistemology of religion, which are largely doxastic, typically define faith as belief in religious propositions. On these accounts, faith and inquiry are seemingly incompatible. However, the historical coexistence of faith and inquiry among religious thinkers and philosophers suggests otherwise. Drawing on conceptual analysis and Daniel Howard-Snyder’s non-doxastic account, this study argues that conceiving of faith as beliefless assuming—a cognitive attitude similar to belief—can resolve the conflict. The article’s contribution lies in offering a framework that distinguishes faith from belief, while incorporating Jane Friedman’s concept of the interrogative attitude and Michael Palmira’s hypothesis-based approach. This framework enables religious believers to actively engage in rational inquiry. The findings indicate that this approach not only offers a theoretical resolution to the faith-inquiry conflict, but also yields practical implications for science-religion dialogue and the methodology of religious studies.This article addresses the apparent conflict between religious faith and inquiry. At the heart of this tension lies an incompatibility: belief requires commitment, whereas inquiry involves questioning and the suspension of judgment. Dominant approaches in the epistemology of religion, which are largely doxastic, typically define faith as belief in religious propositions. On these accounts, faith and inquiry are seemingly incompatible. However, the historical coexistence of faith and inquiry among religious thinkers and philosophers suggests otherwise. Drawing on conceptual analysis and Daniel Howard-Snyder’s non-doxastic account, this study argues that conceiving of faith as beliefless assuming—a cognitive attitude similar to belief—can resolve the conflict. The article’s contribution lies in offering a framework that distinguishes faith from belief, while incorporating Jane Friedman’s concept of the interrogative attitude and Michael Palmira’s hypothesis-based approach. This framework enables religious believers to actively engage in rational inquiry. The findings indicate that this approach not only offers a theoretical resolution to the faith-inquiry conflict, but also yields practical implications for science-religion dialogue and the methodology of religious studies.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_103264_cbd0df822fa67510ec22a199cea3c904.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258220260202The Unconditioned Condition of Consciousness:
Avicenna on the Nature of “Self-Awareness”The Unconditioned Condition of Consciousness:
Avicenna on the Nature of “Self-Awareness”37138810578810.22059/jitp.2025.394421.523605FASajadAmirkhani ShahrakiLecturer and researcher in Islamic philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland.Journal Article20250430This article examines Avicenna’s doctrine of <em>shuʿūr bi-dhāt</em>, or “self-awareness,” and argues that, because it is unmediated by forms or cognitive faculties, this awareness is not of the order of conceptual or representational knowledge. Consequently, <em>shuʿūr bi-dhāt</em> must be distinguished from various forms of self-knowledge that rely on conceptual cognition. According to Avicenna, this awareness possesses three essential features: actuality, permanence, and immediacy. He regards <em>shuʿūr bi-dhāt</em> as the condition for the possibility of every other act of cognition and awareness, since in every judgment—even those whose subject is “I”—the agent is already and pre-reflectively aware that it is <em>he himself</em> who makes the judgment. For this reason, self-awareness, for Avicenna, is axiomatic, a priori, and independent of any other form of cognition: while it constitutes the necessary ground of all awareness, it is itself grounded in nothing beyond itself. Thus, <em>shuʿūr bi-dhāt</em> can be understood as a kind of non-conceptual, a priori awareness that is the unconditioned condition of every other consciousness. This doctrine of self-awareness, though partially resonant with certain analytic-philosophical accounts, is identical with none of them.This article examines Avicenna’s doctrine of <em>shuʿūr bi-dhāt</em>, or “self-awareness,” and argues that, because it is unmediated by forms or cognitive faculties, this awareness is not of the order of conceptual or representational knowledge. Consequently, <em>shuʿūr bi-dhāt</em> must be distinguished from various forms of self-knowledge that rely on conceptual cognition. According to Avicenna, this awareness possesses three essential features: actuality, permanence, and immediacy. He regards <em>shuʿūr bi-dhāt</em> as the condition for the possibility of every other act of cognition and awareness, since in every judgment—even those whose subject is “I”—the agent is already and pre-reflectively aware that it is <em>he himself</em> who makes the judgment. For this reason, self-awareness, for Avicenna, is axiomatic, a priori, and independent of any other form of cognition: while it constitutes the necessary ground of all awareness, it is itself grounded in nothing beyond itself. Thus, <em>shuʿūr bi-dhāt</em> can be understood as a kind of non-conceptual, a priori awareness that is the unconditioned condition of every other consciousness. This doctrine of self-awareness, though partially resonant with certain analytic-philosophical accounts, is identical with none of them.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_105788_7b0fc9bdfa005af97b3389fa48e0b542.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258220260202A Symbolic Representation of Non-Detailed Awareness (al-Ilm al-Ijmali) Based on Disjunctive Propositions and Epistemic OperatorsA Symbolic Representation of Non-Detailed Awareness (al-Ilm al-Ijmali) Based on Disjunctive Propositions and Epistemic Operators39141110578910.22059/jitp.2025.400309.523632FAAhmadEbrahimzadehPhD Student, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran.Fateme SadatNabaviAssistant Professor, Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Basic Sciences, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.Journal Article20250906This article addresses the formalization of the concept of non-detailed awareness (<em>al-ʿIlm al-ijmālī</em>) within the discipline of Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (<em>uṣūl al-fiqh</em>). For this purpose, the proposed symbolic representation must accurately capture the specific characteristics of non-detailed awareness as extensively discussed in Uṣūl al-Fiqh. Following an introduction to the concept, the study points to two key doctrinal issues: its bindingness (munjizīyat) and its dissolution (inḥilāl). Subsequently, the article presents a perspective advanced by contemporary researcher Mahmoud Morvarid concerning the nature of non-detailed awareness. According to this view, the object of such awareness can be explained through a disjunctive proposition. By analyzing a central assumption in Morvarid's framework—namely, that non-detailed and detailed awareness share the same epistemic nature, differing only in their intentional objects—we demonstrate that his approach fails to provide an adequate foundational model for formalizing non-detailed awareness in a manner that fulfills all the requirements set forth in Uṣūl al-Fiqh. Therefore, drawing on scholars of Uṣūl al-Fiqh who conceptualize non-detailed awareness as a conjunction of an awareness and two unawarenesses, we refine the formalization suggested by the aforementioned view. We propose symbolizing non-detailed awareness as one awareness (of a disjunctive proposition) coupled with two unawarenesses (regarding its components), formalized as:
B(p∨q) ∧ Bp ∧ Bq
We further demonstrate that this formalization effectively represents the characteristics of non-detailed awareness as emphasized by scholars of Uṣūl al-Fiqh.This article addresses the formalization of the concept of non-detailed awareness (<em>al-ʿIlm al-ijmālī</em>) within the discipline of Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (<em>uṣūl al-fiqh</em>). For this purpose, the proposed symbolic representation must accurately capture the specific characteristics of non-detailed awareness as extensively discussed in Uṣūl al-Fiqh. Following an introduction to the concept, the study points to two key doctrinal issues: its bindingness (munjizīyat) and its dissolution (inḥilāl). Subsequently, the article presents a perspective advanced by contemporary researcher Mahmoud Morvarid concerning the nature of non-detailed awareness. According to this view, the object of such awareness can be explained through a disjunctive proposition. By analyzing a central assumption in Morvarid's framework—namely, that non-detailed and detailed awareness share the same epistemic nature, differing only in their intentional objects—we demonstrate that his approach fails to provide an adequate foundational model for formalizing non-detailed awareness in a manner that fulfills all the requirements set forth in Uṣūl al-Fiqh. Therefore, drawing on scholars of Uṣūl al-Fiqh who conceptualize non-detailed awareness as a conjunction of an awareness and two unawarenesses, we refine the formalization suggested by the aforementioned view. We propose symbolizing non-detailed awareness as one awareness (of a disjunctive proposition) coupled with two unawarenesses (regarding its components), formalized as:
B(p∨q) ∧ Bp ∧ Bq
We further demonstrate that this formalization effectively represents the characteristics of non-detailed awareness as emphasized by scholars of Uṣūl al-Fiqh.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_105789_396c4b3a94194a5529f29f3cabb10b4e.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258220260202The Cosmological Model of the Oscillatory Universe proposed by Steinhardt and Its Atheistic Implications :
A Critical Study from the Perspective of Sadraian PhilosophyThe Cosmological Model of the Oscillatory Universe proposed by Steinhardt and Its Atheistic Implications :
A Critical Study from the Perspective of Sadraian Philosophy41743810579010.22059/jitp.2025.400412.523634FAZAHRARoyaeePhD Student, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Ahl-al-Bayt (Prophet’s Descendants) Studies, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.JafarShanazariAssociate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Ahl-al-Bayt (Prophet’s Descendants) Studies, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.Journal Article20250821According to the traditional belief of monotheistic theologians, God created the universe ex nihilo, and the cosmos is not eternal. In contrast, Paul Steinhardt, one of the most prominent contemporary physicists, by proposing the Cyclic Universe Model, conceives the cosmos as composed of endless cosmological cycles. Emphasizing the existence of a universe without a beginning, he seeks to present a picture of the world’s eternity and its independence from the hypothesis of a Creator God. This article first introduces and explicates Steinhardt’s cyclic cosmological model, then extracts its philosophical–theological implications, and finally analyzes and evaluates them based on Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Philosophy. Steinhardt interprets the absence of a temporal beginning as negating the necessity of an external Creator and reduces the question of creation to a purely scientific analysis. On the other hand, within Islamic philosophy, Mulla Sadra at times also introduces a cyclical interpretation of the structure of the cosmos; however, his renewed notion of the origination of the world (ḥudūth al-ʿālam) enables a theistic rereading of the cyclic model. This paper demonstrates that our understanding of origination (ḥudūth) in the framework of the Transcendent Theosophy can reinterpret the cyclic structure of the universe as an expression of the continuous manifestation of the Absolute Causal Order. Accordingly, it resolves the apparent contradiction between physical eternity and temporal origination.According to the traditional belief of monotheistic theologians, God created the universe ex nihilo, and the cosmos is not eternal. In contrast, Paul Steinhardt, one of the most prominent contemporary physicists, by proposing the Cyclic Universe Model, conceives the cosmos as composed of endless cosmological cycles. Emphasizing the existence of a universe without a beginning, he seeks to present a picture of the world’s eternity and its independence from the hypothesis of a Creator God. This article first introduces and explicates Steinhardt’s cyclic cosmological model, then extracts its philosophical–theological implications, and finally analyzes and evaluates them based on Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Philosophy. Steinhardt interprets the absence of a temporal beginning as negating the necessity of an external Creator and reduces the question of creation to a purely scientific analysis. On the other hand, within Islamic philosophy, Mulla Sadra at times also introduces a cyclical interpretation of the structure of the cosmos; however, his renewed notion of the origination of the world (ḥudūth al-ʿālam) enables a theistic rereading of the cyclic model. This paper demonstrates that our understanding of origination (ḥudūth) in the framework of the Transcendent Theosophy can reinterpret the cyclic structure of the universe as an expression of the continuous manifestation of the Absolute Causal Order. Accordingly, it resolves the apparent contradiction between physical eternity and temporal origination.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_105790_4751a585ae81e6206cf16384f2884c02.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258220260202Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s Philosophy of MathematicsNaṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s Philosophy of Mathematics44346510579110.22059/jitp.2025.403728.523651FAMortezaMotavalliPhD, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.Journal Article20251005The philosophy of mathematics in the Islamic intellectual tradition is both rich and sophisticated. Like his predecessor Avicenna, who engaged extensively with central problems in the philosophy of mathematics, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī addressed many of these issues and introduced new ones of his own. The aim of this article is to substantiate this claim. Employing an analytical approach, it argues that Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, in the full sense of the term, developed a distinct philosophy of mathematics. Al-Ṭūsī’s principal contributions to the ontology of mathematics are twofold. First, he refuted arguments for finitism—specifically the arguments from collimation and mapping. Second, he analyzed the properties of infinity, arguing that the infinite admits of comparison in terms of “less” and “more.” His contributions to the epistemology of mathematics are likewise significant. First, unlike Avicenna but in line with Ibn al-Haytham, he defended a form of empiricism with respect to mathematical propositions, just as he had defended empiricism regarding mathematical concepts, albeit within an Avicennian framework. Second, he raised the problem of mathematical truth: how mathematical propositions can be true despite being composed of secondary intelligibles that lack external instantiation, while remaining universal, veridical, and applicable to both actualized and non-actualized individuals. In response, al-Ṭūsī proposed an alternative account of truth and advanced his innovative theory of nafs al-amr.The philosophy of mathematics in the Islamic intellectual tradition is both rich and sophisticated. Like his predecessor Avicenna, who engaged extensively with central problems in the philosophy of mathematics, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī addressed many of these issues and introduced new ones of his own. The aim of this article is to substantiate this claim. Employing an analytical approach, it argues that Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, in the full sense of the term, developed a distinct philosophy of mathematics. Al-Ṭūsī’s principal contributions to the ontology of mathematics are twofold. First, he refuted arguments for finitism—specifically the arguments from collimation and mapping. Second, he analyzed the properties of infinity, arguing that the infinite admits of comparison in terms of “less” and “more.” His contributions to the epistemology of mathematics are likewise significant. First, unlike Avicenna but in line with Ibn al-Haytham, he defended a form of empiricism with respect to mathematical propositions, just as he had defended empiricism regarding mathematical concepts, albeit within an Avicennian framework. Second, he raised the problem of mathematical truth: how mathematical propositions can be true despite being composed of secondary intelligibles that lack external instantiation, while remaining universal, veridical, and applicable to both actualized and non-actualized individuals. In response, al-Ṭūsī proposed an alternative account of truth and advanced his innovative theory of nafs al-amr.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_105791_0dd5132e9800525309f21b3bf6383606.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258220260202The Foundations of Action in Mulla Sadra’s Philosophy and Deci and Ryan’s Self-Determination TheoryThe Foundations of Action in Mulla Sadra’s Philosophy and Deci and Ryan’s Self-Determination Theory47149210579210.22059/jitp.2025.395903.523618FAMohammad SadeghYousofvandPhD Student, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Ahl-al-Bayt (Prophet’s Descendants) Studies, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.ForoughRahimpourAssociate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Ahl-al-Bayt (Prophet’s Descendants) Studies, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.MahdiGanjvarAssociate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Ahl-al-Bayt (Prophet’s Descendants) Studies, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.AhmadShahgoliAssociate Professor, Department of Kalam, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran.Mohammad SadeghShojaeiAssistant Professor, Department ofat Al-Mustafa International University, Institute for Humanities, Qom, IranJournal Article20250528Human behavior, along with the processes involved in its formation, guidance, regulation, and transformation, has long been a central concern across multiple scientific disciplines. Despite extensive scholarship in both philosophy and psychology, systematic comparisons between the philosophical account of the foundations of action in Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought and the psychological framework of Self-Determination Theory proposed by Deci and Ryan remain scarce. This study seeks to identify points of convergence and divergence between these two approaches and to explore their implications for psychology and education. Mullā Ṣadrā examines the foundations of action within the framework of philosophical anthropology, analyzing human behavior through metaphysical principles. In his philosophy, the foundations of action are articulated as a hierarchy of psychic faculties—ranging from perception to the active faculty—with particular emphasis on the relationship between motivation and the existential levels of the human soul. By contrast, Self-Determination Theory emphasizes three innate psychological needs—autonomy, competence, and relatedness—as the primary drivers of behavior, and conceptualizes motivation along a continuum extending from intrinsic motivation to amotivation. Adopting a comparative-analytical methodology and drawing on primary philosophical and psychological sources, this study finds that both perspectives regard desire as fundamental to action and distinguish between internal and external determinants of behavior. However, they differ significantly in their accounts of the origin and structure of motivation: Mullā Ṣadrā situates motivation in transcendent ends and presents it within a hierarchical framework, whereas Deci and Ryan ground motivation in psychological needs and emphasize the dynamic, simultaneous interaction of motivational components. This comparative analysis offers valuable insights for enriching contemporary motivational psychology and informing the design of educational interventions.Human behavior, along with the processes involved in its formation, guidance, regulation, and transformation, has long been a central concern across multiple scientific disciplines. Despite extensive scholarship in both philosophy and psychology, systematic comparisons between the philosophical account of the foundations of action in Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought and the psychological framework of Self-Determination Theory proposed by Deci and Ryan remain scarce. This study seeks to identify points of convergence and divergence between these two approaches and to explore their implications for psychology and education. Mullā Ṣadrā examines the foundations of action within the framework of philosophical anthropology, analyzing human behavior through metaphysical principles. In his philosophy, the foundations of action are articulated as a hierarchy of psychic faculties—ranging from perception to the active faculty—with particular emphasis on the relationship between motivation and the existential levels of the human soul. By contrast, Self-Determination Theory emphasizes three innate psychological needs—autonomy, competence, and relatedness—as the primary drivers of behavior, and conceptualizes motivation along a continuum extending from intrinsic motivation to amotivation. Adopting a comparative-analytical methodology and drawing on primary philosophical and psychological sources, this study finds that both perspectives regard desire as fundamental to action and distinguish between internal and external determinants of behavior. However, they differ significantly in their accounts of the origin and structure of motivation: Mullā Ṣadrā situates motivation in transcendent ends and presents it within a hierarchical framework, whereas Deci and Ryan ground motivation in psychological needs and emphasize the dynamic, simultaneous interaction of motivational components. This comparative analysis offers valuable insights for enriching contemporary motivational psychology and informing the design of educational interventions.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_105792_a61f2afd61f7530312a29973df044442.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258220260202The Opposition of Possession and Privation (Malaka wa ʿAdam) between Unity and MultiplicityThe Opposition of Possession and Privation (Malaka wa ʿAdam) between Unity and Multiplicity49752010579310.22059/jitp.2025.407080.523673FAMehdiMalekshahisefatPhD, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Kalam, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Sciences, Ilam University, Ilam, Iran.MostafaMalekshahisefatAssistant Professor, Department of Islamic Studies Teaching, Farhangian University, Tehran, Iran.Journal Article20251126The fundamental problem of the relationship between unity and multiplicity in being is one of the most challenging philosophical issues that has continuously engaged philosophers throughout the history of thought. This article critically examines four prevalent theories concerning the nature of the opposition between unity and multiplicity: (1) opposition by contrariety, (2) opposition by correlation (relational opposition), (3) the denial of any opposition, and (4) the proposal of a fifth type of opposition. After presenting and critically assessing these views and clarifying their inadequacies in accounting for the ontological nature of existence, it is argued that none of these categories can adequately explain the genuine relationship between unity and multiplicity. This shortcoming reveals the necessity of providing a more precise account of the type of opposition involved. By means of a careful analysis of the distinct logical domains of opposition based on the concepts of essential predication and composite predication the article advances a novel theory. According to this theory, the opposition between unity and multiplicity is neither one of contrariety nor correlation; rather, it is most accurately understood as a type of privation and possession (malaka wa ʿadam). This approach offers a coherent and profound framework for understanding the nature of the opposition between unity and multiplicity within the philosophical system and opens new horizons for ontological inquiry.The fundamental problem of the relationship between unity and multiplicity in being is one of the most challenging philosophical issues that has continuously engaged philosophers throughout the history of thought. This article critically examines four prevalent theories concerning the nature of the opposition between unity and multiplicity: (1) opposition by contrariety, (2) opposition by correlation (relational opposition), (3) the denial of any opposition, and (4) the proposal of a fifth type of opposition. After presenting and critically assessing these views and clarifying their inadequacies in accounting for the ontological nature of existence, it is argued that none of these categories can adequately explain the genuine relationship between unity and multiplicity. This shortcoming reveals the necessity of providing a more precise account of the type of opposition involved. By means of a careful analysis of the distinct logical domains of opposition based on the concepts of essential predication and composite predication the article advances a novel theory. According to this theory, the opposition between unity and multiplicity is neither one of contrariety nor correlation; rather, it is most accurately understood as a type of privation and possession (malaka wa ʿadam). This approach offers a coherent and profound framework for understanding the nature of the opposition between unity and multiplicity within the philosophical system and opens new horizons for ontological inquiry.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_105793_b2f9c4952b8d0a7a1ee9533653fd9c16.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258220260202An Analysis of the Foundations of the Fundamentality of Quiddity and the Fundamentality of Existence Based on the Objective Form of Philosophical Concepts
With Emphasis on the Views of Suhrawardī, Mīrdāmād, and Mullā ṢadrāAn Analysis of the Foundations of the Fundamentality of Quiddity and the Fundamentality of Existence Based on the Objective Form of Philosophical Concepts
With Emphasis on the Views of Suhrawardī, Mīrdāmād, and Mullā Ṣadrā52354310579410.22059/jitp.2026.399714.523630FAMOHAMMAD BAGHERDERAKHSHAN POURPhD Candidate in Philosophy of Physics, Department of Philosophy of Disciplines, Faculty of Philosophy and Ethics, Baqir al-Olum University, Qom, IranMasoudAbdollahzadeh ArpanahiAssociate Professor, Department of Philosophy of Science and Technology, Faculty of Basic Sciences, Imam Hossein Comprehensive University, Tehran, Iran.YaraliKord FirouzjaeiProfessor, Department of Applied Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy and Ethics, Baqir al-Olum University, Qom, Iran.MirsaeidMousavi KarimiProfessor, Department of Philosophy, Mofid University, Qom, IranJournal Article20250811This paper adopts an analytical-comparative method to examine the foundations of the Fundamentality of Quiddity and the Fundamentality of Existence in Islamic philosophy, with particular attention to the objective form of secondary philosophical intelligibles (existence, contingency, unity) and logical categories (genus, differentia). Suhrawardī and Mīrdāmād, as the founders of the former school, deny an independent objective form to these categories on the grounds of the impossibility of infinite regress. They regard existence merely as the "realization of quiddity," considering quiddity as the sole authentic reality. Consequently, external reality is viewed as a "mixed single object," and these categories are deemed mental considerations. This approach, however, faces a challenge in explaining the correspondence between mind and reality. In contrast, Mullā Ṣadrā, emphasizing the Fundamentality of Existence, conceives existence as a unitary, simple, and graded reality that constitutes the authentic objective form. By distinguishing between "concrete attribution"— in which both subject and attribute have independent objective forms—and "abstractive attribution"—in which the attribute lacks a separate objective form—he explains mind–reality correspondence based on the unity of existence. The paper concludes that disagreement over the independent objective form of these philosophical concepts lies at the core of the divergence between these schools regarding the structure of reality and the criterion of truth.This paper adopts an analytical-comparative method to examine the foundations of the Fundamentality of Quiddity and the Fundamentality of Existence in Islamic philosophy, with particular attention to the objective form of secondary philosophical intelligibles (existence, contingency, unity) and logical categories (genus, differentia). Suhrawardī and Mīrdāmād, as the founders of the former school, deny an independent objective form to these categories on the grounds of the impossibility of infinite regress. They regard existence merely as the "realization of quiddity," considering quiddity as the sole authentic reality. Consequently, external reality is viewed as a "mixed single object," and these categories are deemed mental considerations. This approach, however, faces a challenge in explaining the correspondence between mind and reality. In contrast, Mullā Ṣadrā, emphasizing the Fundamentality of Existence, conceives existence as a unitary, simple, and graded reality that constitutes the authentic objective form. By distinguishing between "concrete attribution"— in which both subject and attribute have independent objective forms—and "abstractive attribution"—in which the attribute lacks a separate objective form—he explains mind–reality correspondence based on the unity of existence. The paper concludes that disagreement over the independent objective form of these philosophical concepts lies at the core of the divergence between these schools regarding the structure of reality and the criterion of truth.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_105794_013d217a4f0ded06c650585c04238cd2.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258220260202A Comparative Analysis of the Rational Foundations of Self-Knowledge in Avicenna and Sydney Shoemaker
From Knowledge by Presence to Immunity to Error through MisidentificationA Comparative Analysis of the Rational Foundations of Self-Knowledge in Avicenna and Sydney Shoemaker
From Knowledge by Presence to Immunity to Error through Misidentification54957310579510.22059/jitp.2026.404063.523655FAJavadHeydarianPhD Student, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Kalam, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Sciences, Ilam University, Ilam, Iran.RezaRezazadeh, Associate Professor, Department of Religions and Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Foreign Languages, University Kashan, Kashan, Iran.MajidZiaei GhahnaviehAssociate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Kalam, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Sciences, Ilam University, Ilam, Iran.Journal Article20251012This study employs an analytic-comparative approach to reconstruct the rational foundations of self-awareness in the frameworks of Avicenna and Sydney Shoemaker, elucidating the source of "first-person privilege" in subject-involving judgments and its boundary with observational or mirror-based claims. The core issue is why subject-identification in statements like "I am in pain" is immune to misidentification errors, whereas in mirror judgments such as "I look pale"—which rely on visual reflection—this immunity weakens. The paper's aim is to articulate a two-level model of "presence/reference" and the "subject/content" mapping, demonstrating how "fundamental immunity of awareness-ownership" can be preserved as a precondition while "content fallibility" is explained as a validity condition. The method involves textual analysis of primary sources: on Avicenna's side, the theory of "knowledge by presence" and the "Flying Man" thought experiment ground "primitive presence" as the precondition for attention and judgment; on Shoemaker's side, "non-descriptive I-reference," the principle of "immunity to error through misidentification" (IEM), and "first-person authority"—with acknowledgment of judgment context-sensitivity—are examined. Findings reveal that the ontological level of presence provides the existential basis for "subject stabilization," while the logical-normative level of reference explains its linguistic-logical realization in subject-involving avowals. Thus, the "subject" remains immune to referential error, whereas the "content" (type, intensity, cause, or object of experience) remains evaluable and calibratable. The result is a demarcation of IEM's context-sensitive scope, avoidance of conflating ontological and semantic levels in self-awareness analysis, and criteria for assessing first-person claims across introspective, memory-based, testimonial, and mirror contexts.This study employs an analytic-comparative approach to reconstruct the rational foundations of self-awareness in the frameworks of Avicenna and Sydney Shoemaker, elucidating the source of "first-person privilege" in subject-involving judgments and its boundary with observational or mirror-based claims. The core issue is why subject-identification in statements like "I am in pain" is immune to misidentification errors, whereas in mirror judgments such as "I look pale"—which rely on visual reflection—this immunity weakens. The paper's aim is to articulate a two-level model of "presence/reference" and the "subject/content" mapping, demonstrating how "fundamental immunity of awareness-ownership" can be preserved as a precondition while "content fallibility" is explained as a validity condition. The method involves textual analysis of primary sources: on Avicenna's side, the theory of "knowledge by presence" and the "Flying Man" thought experiment ground "primitive presence" as the precondition for attention and judgment; on Shoemaker's side, "non-descriptive I-reference," the principle of "immunity to error through misidentification" (IEM), and "first-person authority"—with acknowledgment of judgment context-sensitivity—are examined. Findings reveal that the ontological level of presence provides the existential basis for "subject stabilization," while the logical-normative level of reference explains its linguistic-logical realization in subject-involving avowals. Thus, the "subject" remains immune to referential error, whereas the "content" (type, intensity, cause, or object of experience) remains evaluable and calibratable. The result is a demarcation of IEM's context-sensitive scope, avoidance of conflating ontological and semantic levels in self-awareness analysis, and criteria for assessing first-person claims across introspective, memory-based, testimonial, and mirror contexts.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_105795_ff65568c3b265051884ef76928640649.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258220260202Abū ʿAlī al‑ Jubba’i on the Gettier ProblemAbū ʿAlī al‑ Jubba’i on the Gettier Problem57758810579610.22059/jitp.2026.397700.523624FAAbbasDehghaninejadAssistant Professor, Department of Islamic Studies Teaching, Farhangian University, Tehran, Iran.Mohammad MahdiDehghani AshkezariAssistant Professor, Department of Islamic Studies Teaching, Farhangian University, Tehran, Iran.Journal Article20250701Abu Ali al-Jubbaʾi, in addition to the three well-known conditions of knowledge as justified true belief, proposed two further conditions: (4) the reliability of the cognitive process and (5) the no-defeater (indefeasibility) condition. The fourth condition concerns the reliability of the belief-forming process and closely parallels contemporary Reliabilism, which emphasizes the acquisition of belief through dependable cognitive faculties. The fifth condition corresponds to a form of logical consistency or defeasibility requirement; however, given al-Jubbaʾi’s retention of the strong condition of truth, the addition of a defeasibility criterion may initially appear redundant. Nevertheless, this condition closely aligns with the Defeasibility Theory developed by Lehrer and Paxson. Al-Jubbaʾi also objected to Abu al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllaf’s emphasis on epistemic accessibility, arguing that one may possess knowledge without being able to articulate a supporting argument. The convergence of his views with Reliabilism and Defeasibility Theory, together with his rejection of the accessibility requirement, clearly situates al-Jubbaʾi within the framework of Epistemic Externalism. Examining the works of Muslim theologians through contemporary epistemological frameworks reveals a rich and sophisticated tradition of philosophical inquiry that remains highly relevant to modern epistemological debates.Abu Ali al-Jubbaʾi, in addition to the three well-known conditions of knowledge as justified true belief, proposed two further conditions: (4) the reliability of the cognitive process and (5) the no-defeater (indefeasibility) condition. The fourth condition concerns the reliability of the belief-forming process and closely parallels contemporary Reliabilism, which emphasizes the acquisition of belief through dependable cognitive faculties. The fifth condition corresponds to a form of logical consistency or defeasibility requirement; however, given al-Jubbaʾi’s retention of the strong condition of truth, the addition of a defeasibility criterion may initially appear redundant. Nevertheless, this condition closely aligns with the Defeasibility Theory developed by Lehrer and Paxson. Al-Jubbaʾi also objected to Abu al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllaf’s emphasis on epistemic accessibility, arguing that one may possess knowledge without being able to articulate a supporting argument. The convergence of his views with Reliabilism and Defeasibility Theory, together with his rejection of the accessibility requirement, clearly situates al-Jubbaʾi within the framework of Epistemic Externalism. Examining the works of Muslim theologians through contemporary epistemological frameworks reveals a rich and sophisticated tradition of philosophical inquiry that remains highly relevant to modern epistemological debates.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_105796_0774075b3279f75014964d4fa06c3694.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258220260202The Evolution of the Concept of I’tibāriyyah and Its Impact on the Identity of Divine Attributes with the Essence in the Thought of Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn ShīrāzīThe Evolution of the Concept of I’tibāriyyah and Its Impact on the Identity of Divine Attributes with the Essence in the Thought of Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn Shīrāzī59361110579710.22059/jitp.2026.392603.523599FAHaniyehAmininejadMA, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.HassanEbrahimiAssociate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.Journal Article20250414The relationship between the attributes and the Divine Essence is one of the most difficult and significant topics in Islamic theology, extensively examined by both theological and philosophical schools. Reconciling the preservation of divine unity (tawḥīd) and simplicity (basāṭah) with the existence of multiple attributes in the Necessary Being poses a profound and far-reaching challenge. In theological discourse, attempts to address this problem have included propositions such as the negation of attributes from the Divine Essence, the addition of attributes to the Divine Essence, and the substitution of the Essence for the attributes. Philosophers, by contrast, proposed the theory of the identity of attributes with the Divine Essence. Although the theory of identity offers clear and rational grounds, its internal complexity—particularly the integration of multiplicity within unity—remained ambiguous prior to Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn. Transcendent Wisdom (al-Ḥikmah al-Muta‘āliyah), through the introduction of taḥaqquqāt i‘tibāriyyah (mentally abstracted actualizations), brought transformative insights to philosophy, including the resolution of this challenge and the possibility of assimilating multiplicities within a unitary existence. Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s first engagement with the problem of integrating multiplicity into unity is expressed through these ḥaqā’iq i‘tibāriyyah (abstracted realities). He particularly emphasizes this in his discussion of the identity of attributes with the Essence and the Simple Reality (al-basīṭ al-ḥaqīqah), through the notions of the fundamentality of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd) and the abstracted nature of quiddity (i‘tibāriyyat al-māhiyyah). The central aim of this research is to demonstrate how the understanding of i‘tibāriyyah under the category of the reality of quiddity (mawjūdiyyat al-māhiyyah) informs and supports the problem of the identity of attributes with the Essence. By introducing several prominent conceptions of i‘tibāriyyah and explicating the "aspect of negational restriction" (ḥaythiyyat taqyīdiyyah nafyiyyah) and the "aspect of amalgamative restriction" (ḥaythiyyat taqyīdiyyah indimājiyyah), the study shows that only this specific understanding of the abstracted nature of quiddity, as expressed in the preferred conception, generates amalgamative actualizations and provides the necessary foundation for Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s account of the identity of attributes.The relationship between the attributes and the Divine Essence is one of the most difficult and significant topics in Islamic theology, extensively examined by both theological and philosophical schools. Reconciling the preservation of divine unity (tawḥīd) and simplicity (basāṭah) with the existence of multiple attributes in the Necessary Being poses a profound and far-reaching challenge. In theological discourse, attempts to address this problem have included propositions such as the negation of attributes from the Divine Essence, the addition of attributes to the Divine Essence, and the substitution of the Essence for the attributes. Philosophers, by contrast, proposed the theory of the identity of attributes with the Divine Essence. Although the theory of identity offers clear and rational grounds, its internal complexity—particularly the integration of multiplicity within unity—remained ambiguous prior to Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn. Transcendent Wisdom (al-Ḥikmah al-Muta‘āliyah), through the introduction of taḥaqquqāt i‘tibāriyyah (mentally abstracted actualizations), brought transformative insights to philosophy, including the resolution of this challenge and the possibility of assimilating multiplicities within a unitary existence. Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s first engagement with the problem of integrating multiplicity into unity is expressed through these ḥaqā’iq i‘tibāriyyah (abstracted realities). He particularly emphasizes this in his discussion of the identity of attributes with the Essence and the Simple Reality (al-basīṭ al-ḥaqīqah), through the notions of the fundamentality of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd) and the abstracted nature of quiddity (i‘tibāriyyat al-māhiyyah). The central aim of this research is to demonstrate how the understanding of i‘tibāriyyah under the category of the reality of quiddity (mawjūdiyyat al-māhiyyah) informs and supports the problem of the identity of attributes with the Essence. By introducing several prominent conceptions of i‘tibāriyyah and explicating the "aspect of negational restriction" (ḥaythiyyat taqyīdiyyah nafyiyyah) and the "aspect of amalgamative restriction" (ḥaythiyyat taqyīdiyyah indimājiyyah), the study shows that only this specific understanding of the abstracted nature of quiddity, as expressed in the preferred conception, generates amalgamative actualizations and provides the necessary foundation for Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s account of the identity of attributes.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_105797_7cb881805381a446edcce56e92b488f9.pdf