Univrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258120250411A Critical Analysis of Al-Farabi’s Perspective on Examples of Meaning ParticlesA Critical Analysis of Al-Farabi’s Perspective on Examples of Meaning Particles32510152010.22059/jitp.2025.385340.523557FAKeramatVarzdarPhD, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.0000-0001-6880-7095Journal Article20241113The primary focus of this research is a critical analysis of Al-Farabi's perspective on "meaning particles" in the Arabic language. The aim is to demonstrate the inadequacy of Farabi's viewpoint through a logical critique of the traditional tripartite classification of words into nouns, verbs, and particles. In his logical treatises, Farabi adopts the conventional threefold division proposed by syntactic scholars, categorizing words into nouns, verbs, and particles according to traditional methods. However, he introduces a novel distinction within the category of particles, excluding certain word types—such as pronouns, demonstrative nouns, conjunctions, interrogative nouns, and incomplete verbs—from the categories of nouns and verbs, instead classifying them as "particles." This research highlights several critical points: Firstly, while Farabi accurately identifies the failure of syntactic scholars to adhere to the rules of definitional logic, effectively challenging them in this regard, he errs in his categorization. Specifically, he mistakenly classifies the aforementioned word types under the category of particles. Secondly, this mistake arises from Farabi's illogical adherence to the rigid framework of the tripartite word classification. By confining words to the categories of nouns, verbs, and particles, Farabi's framework fails to accommodate the complexity of linguistic categories. Thirdly, the widely recognized tripartite classification, whether based on definition or the criterion of "accepting both a predicate and information about it or not," lacks a sound logical foundation and rational constraints. Fourthly, the criterion of "lack of semantic independence" proves inadequate as a distinguishing feature for categorizing "meaning particles" separately from nouns and verbs. In conclusion, these critiques illustrate that to advance Farabi's work, we must move beyond the constraints of the tripartite division and instead propose a new classification system for understanding the structure of language.The primary focus of this research is a critical analysis of Al-Farabi's perspective on "meaning particles" in the Arabic language. The aim is to demonstrate the inadequacy of Farabi's viewpoint through a logical critique of the traditional tripartite classification of words into nouns, verbs, and particles. In his logical treatises, Farabi adopts the conventional threefold division proposed by syntactic scholars, categorizing words into nouns, verbs, and particles according to traditional methods. However, he introduces a novel distinction within the category of particles, excluding certain word types—such as pronouns, demonstrative nouns, conjunctions, interrogative nouns, and incomplete verbs—from the categories of nouns and verbs, instead classifying them as "particles." This research highlights several critical points: Firstly, while Farabi accurately identifies the failure of syntactic scholars to adhere to the rules of definitional logic, effectively challenging them in this regard, he errs in his categorization. Specifically, he mistakenly classifies the aforementioned word types under the category of particles. Secondly, this mistake arises from Farabi's illogical adherence to the rigid framework of the tripartite word classification. By confining words to the categories of nouns, verbs, and particles, Farabi's framework fails to accommodate the complexity of linguistic categories. Thirdly, the widely recognized tripartite classification, whether based on definition or the criterion of "accepting both a predicate and information about it or not," lacks a sound logical foundation and rational constraints. Fourthly, the criterion of "lack of semantic independence" proves inadequate as a distinguishing feature for categorizing "meaning particles" separately from nouns and verbs. In conclusion, these critiques illustrate that to advance Farabi's work, we must move beyond the constraints of the tripartite division and instead propose a new classification system for understanding the structure of language.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_101520_4fa62ab87e971d3a76a73722da1a44a1.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258120250411The Concept of Pure Monotheism, its Foundations and Implications in Rajab-‘Ali Tabrizi’s Neo-Peripatetic SchoolThe Concept of Pure Monotheism, its Foundations and Implications in Rajab-‘Ali Tabrizi’s Neo-Peripatetic School295110158210.22059/jitp.2025.381489.523535FAMahmudHedayatafzaPhD, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.0000-0002-8874-210XJournal Article20240826The most distinctive feature of Rajab-‘Ali Tabrizi’s Neo-Peripatetic school and his students is their interpretation of divine essence and attributes based on negative theology (tanzīh). This study, using primary sources from Tabrizi and his students and employing a descriptive-analytical method, examines the concept of "pure monotheism" in this intellectual framework. This concept is articulated in their works through an explanation of the arguments for the negation of attributes and its implications for understanding the meanings of God's names. Tabrizi argues that attributes of perfection—such as knowledge and power—are neither identical with the One Essence nor accidental to it. His particular understanding of "attribute" and its distinction from essence paved the way for his assertion of the absolute negation of attributes. To rationally support his position, Tabrizi presents a general argument against the union of two distinct entities and a specific argument against the union of essence and attribute. He also cites textual evidence from Imamī sources, particularly the monotheistic sermons of Imam ‘Alī and Imam al-Riḍā. Furthermore, in the works of Tabrizi and his students, we find responses to potential objections against the negation of attributes doctrine. To address these concerns, they propose a significant framework for understanding the meanings of God’s names in theological statements, based on negative theology, theology of divine actions, and interpretative theology.The most distinctive feature of Rajab-‘Ali Tabrizi’s Neo-Peripatetic school and his students is their interpretation of divine essence and attributes based on negative theology (tanzīh). This study, using primary sources from Tabrizi and his students and employing a descriptive-analytical method, examines the concept of "pure monotheism" in this intellectual framework. This concept is articulated in their works through an explanation of the arguments for the negation of attributes and its implications for understanding the meanings of God's names. Tabrizi argues that attributes of perfection—such as knowledge and power—are neither identical with the One Essence nor accidental to it. His particular understanding of "attribute" and its distinction from essence paved the way for his assertion of the absolute negation of attributes. To rationally support his position, Tabrizi presents a general argument against the union of two distinct entities and a specific argument against the union of essence and attribute. He also cites textual evidence from Imamī sources, particularly the monotheistic sermons of Imam ‘Alī and Imam al-Riḍā. Furthermore, in the works of Tabrizi and his students, we find responses to potential objections against the negation of attributes doctrine. To address these concerns, they propose a significant framework for understanding the meanings of God’s names in theological statements, based on negative theology, theology of divine actions, and interpretative theology.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_101582_25b86f731b64fd02ee3ae125a4d7d883.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258120250615The Role of “Hūr Qalyā” (Spiritual Maturity) in Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist PhilosophyThe Role of “Hūr Qalyā” (Spiritual Maturity) in Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist Philosophy557710248310.22059/jitp.2025.387652.523567FASaeedAnvariAssociate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Persian Literature and Foreign Languages, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran.0000-0002-9402-880XEsmailShamsAssistant Professor, Department of History, Faculty of Persian Literature and Foreign Languages, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran.0000-0002-0680-0581Journal Article20241226Sheykh Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī employs the term Hūr Qalyā in his works, yet its precise meaning and etymology remain the subject of scholarly debate. Previous studies have variously traced its origin to Persian (Pahlavi), Greek, Syriac, or Hebrew. The term is also utilized in the theology of the Shaykhiyya school, and this specific usage has at times led to misinterpretations when applied to Suhrawardī’s Ishrāqī system of thought. This article introduces and critically examines the nine principal interpretations proposed thus far and advances a new reading of the term. According to this reading, the first component, hūr, signifies “sun,” while qalyā, drawn from ancient medicine and natural science, denotes “roasting,” making the literal meaning “cooking by the sun.” Within the framework of Suhrawardī’s ḥikmat al-ishrāq (Philosophy of Illumination), Hūr Qalyā designates a spiritual rank for sāliks (seekers) who attain maturity by means of the “sun of truth,” thus becoming capable of extraordinary actions. This stage precedes Khurrat-i Kayānī and pertains to intermediate seekers along the mystical path. The article clarifies both the lexical and technical usage of the term, drawing on contexts from Suhrawardī’s treatise al-Muṭāraḥāt.Sheykh Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī employs the term Hūr Qalyā in his works, yet its precise meaning and etymology remain the subject of scholarly debate. Previous studies have variously traced its origin to Persian (Pahlavi), Greek, Syriac, or Hebrew. The term is also utilized in the theology of the Shaykhiyya school, and this specific usage has at times led to misinterpretations when applied to Suhrawardī’s Ishrāqī system of thought. This article introduces and critically examines the nine principal interpretations proposed thus far and advances a new reading of the term. According to this reading, the first component, hūr, signifies “sun,” while qalyā, drawn from ancient medicine and natural science, denotes “roasting,” making the literal meaning “cooking by the sun.” Within the framework of Suhrawardī’s ḥikmat al-ishrāq (Philosophy of Illumination), Hūr Qalyā designates a spiritual rank for sāliks (seekers) who attain maturity by means of the “sun of truth,” thus becoming capable of extraordinary actions. This stage precedes Khurrat-i Kayānī and pertains to intermediate seekers along the mystical path. The article clarifies both the lexical and technical usage of the term, drawing on contexts from Suhrawardī’s treatise al-Muṭāraḥāt.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_102483_7fa413de7e8daaa8f53d0a0a8c202994.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258120250615God as Absolute Existence in Ibn ʿArabī: al-Taftāzānī’s Refutations of Akbarian MetaphysicsGod as Absolute Existence in Ibn ʿArabī: al-Taftāzānī’s Refutations of Akbarian Metaphysics8110210248410.22059/jitp.2025.383903.523545FATahaAbdollahi SohiMA, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.0009-0006-1698-9855Amir AbbasAli ZamaniAssociate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.0000-0001-6752-6718Journal Article20241019Throughout Islamic intellectual history, a wide range of conceptions of God have been articulated, among which the problematic view of Ibn ʿArabī—identifying God with Absolute Existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq)—stands out. Numerous critiques have been leveled against this identification, but the objections of Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī are particularly notable for their originality, clarity, and lasting influence on post-classical Islamic thought. In his Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, al-Taftāzānī formulates several arguments against Ibn ʿArabī’s conception of God, focusing on the philosophical notion of Existence. Al-Taftāzānī regards Absolute Existence as a maʿqūl thānī (secondary intelligible), a universal concept in the mind with no extra-mental reality, which is instantiated only through its particular instances in the external world. He contends that this notion of Absolute Existence cannot be identical with God (or Necessary Existence), since God is an actual entity (ḥaqīqat fī al-khārij) and not merely a mental concept. This article critically examines al-Taftāzānī’s objections, arguing that his reading is misleading and that his refutation is grounded in a conception of Absolute Existence that differs significantly from that held by Ibn ʿArabī and his followers. Having contextualized al-Taftāzānī’s objections, I have sought to reconsider and rearticulate Ibn ʿArabī’s conception of God.Throughout Islamic intellectual history, a wide range of conceptions of God have been articulated, among which the problematic view of Ibn ʿArabī—identifying God with Absolute Existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq)—stands out. Numerous critiques have been leveled against this identification, but the objections of Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī are particularly notable for their originality, clarity, and lasting influence on post-classical Islamic thought. In his Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, al-Taftāzānī formulates several arguments against Ibn ʿArabī’s conception of God, focusing on the philosophical notion of Existence. Al-Taftāzānī regards Absolute Existence as a maʿqūl thānī (secondary intelligible), a universal concept in the mind with no extra-mental reality, which is instantiated only through its particular instances in the external world. He contends that this notion of Absolute Existence cannot be identical with God (or Necessary Existence), since God is an actual entity (ḥaqīqat fī al-khārij) and not merely a mental concept. This article critically examines al-Taftāzānī’s objections, arguing that his reading is misleading and that his refutation is grounded in a conception of Absolute Existence that differs significantly from that held by Ibn ʿArabī and his followers. Having contextualized al-Taftāzānī’s objections, I have sought to reconsider and rearticulate Ibn ʿArabī’s conception of God.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_102484_9ac4f88c3516c28af867598eba8b1ad5.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258120250615The Role of Virtues, Transcendence, and Spirituality in Elliot D. Cohen’s Logic-Based Therapy and Consultation (LBTC)The Role of Virtues, Transcendence, and Spirituality in Elliot D. Cohen’s Logic-Based Therapy and Consultation (LBTC)10512710248510.22059/jitp.2025.386658.523562FANargesNazarnejadAssociate Professor, Department of Philosophy and Islamic Wisdom, Faculty of Theology, Alzahra University, Tehran, Iran0000-0001-5271-8629Journal Article20241208This paper investigates the role of virtues, excellence, and spirituality within Elliot D. Cohen’s Logic-Based Therapy and Consultation (LBTC), situated in the broader domain of applied philosophy. As an outgrowth of Albert Ellis’s Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT), LBTC exhibits notable affinities with positive psychology but is distinguished by its explicit focus on rational and moral virtues, as well as its commitment to cultivating a desire for virtuous living among clients. Beyond the emphasis on guiding virtues, Cohen introduces the concepts of excellence and spirituality, illustrating how the pursuit of virtue can lead to personal excellence and ultimately open the possibility of spiritual experience. Significantly, Cohen contends that these spiritual experiences are accessible to both religious and non-religious individuals: for religiously oriented clients, spirituality may assume a specifically religious character, whereas for secular or non-religious clients, the experience of liberation retains an inherently spiritual dimension. The primary data for this study derive from a comprehensive review of library sources, and the methodology is grounded in rational analysis.This paper investigates the role of virtues, excellence, and spirituality within Elliot D. Cohen’s Logic-Based Therapy and Consultation (LBTC), situated in the broader domain of applied philosophy. As an outgrowth of Albert Ellis’s Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT), LBTC exhibits notable affinities with positive psychology but is distinguished by its explicit focus on rational and moral virtues, as well as its commitment to cultivating a desire for virtuous living among clients. Beyond the emphasis on guiding virtues, Cohen introduces the concepts of excellence and spirituality, illustrating how the pursuit of virtue can lead to personal excellence and ultimately open the possibility of spiritual experience. Significantly, Cohen contends that these spiritual experiences are accessible to both religious and non-religious individuals: for religiously oriented clients, spirituality may assume a specifically religious character, whereas for secular or non-religious clients, the experience of liberation retains an inherently spiritual dimension. The primary data for this study derive from a comprehensive review of library sources, and the methodology is grounded in rational analysis.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_102485_0a1595cacaa6446fb5ec0a893e0bc9b5.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258120250819A Novel Analysis of Imagination and Its Role in the Formation of Affections from the Perspective of Transcendental PhilosophyA Novel Analysis of Imagination and Its Role in the Formation of Affections from the Perspective of Transcendental Philosophy13115210321810.22059/jitp.2025.385375.523558FAMassoudZeinolabedinPhD, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, School of Humanities, Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training University, Tehran, Iran0000-0002-4172-2777AbdullahSalavatiProfessor, Department of Theology and Islamic Studies, School of Humanities, Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training University, Tehran, Iran.0000-0001-6401-0003Journal Article20241114The study of human affections is a significant and practical issue within both psychology and epistemology. This research aims to elucidate the process by which affections are formed and regulated within the realm of human imagination, drawing upon Mulla Sadra’s philosophical innovations. Employing an analytical methodology, we demonstrate that Mulla Sadra elevates imagination from a passive faculty of perception to an active and dynamic dimension of the soul—one capable of generating forms, comprehending meanings, storing and possessing these forms and meanings, whether in conjunction with Reason or independently. The imaginative realm thus plays a crucial role in the management of human affections and enjoys a unity and integrity with the soul at the level of imagination. Consequently, it synthesizes and integrates both the perceptual and desiderative components of affection. Human affections, as conceived here, possess both cognitive and conative dimensions, and the imaginative faculty shapes affections by mediating and managing these two domains. Ultimately, in Sadra’s philosophical system, the imaginative faculty is endowed with the threefold functions of perception, preservation, and possession, enabling it to create, sustain, and regulate human affections.The study of human affections is a significant and practical issue within both psychology and epistemology. This research aims to elucidate the process by which affections are formed and regulated within the realm of human imagination, drawing upon Mulla Sadra’s philosophical innovations. Employing an analytical methodology, we demonstrate that Mulla Sadra elevates imagination from a passive faculty of perception to an active and dynamic dimension of the soul—one capable of generating forms, comprehending meanings, storing and possessing these forms and meanings, whether in conjunction with Reason or independently. The imaginative realm thus plays a crucial role in the management of human affections and enjoys a unity and integrity with the soul at the level of imagination. Consequently, it synthesizes and integrates both the perceptual and desiderative components of affection. Human affections, as conceived here, possess both cognitive and conative dimensions, and the imaginative faculty shapes affections by mediating and managing these two domains. Ultimately, in Sadra’s philosophical system, the imaginative faculty is endowed with the threefold functions of perception, preservation, and possession, enabling it to create, sustain, and regulate human affections.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_103218_d3f07dc1fd97de86a568c4ad489473a5.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258120250819The Role of Khorasan in the Transmission and Development of Intellectual Sciences at the Najaf SeminaryThe Role of Khorasan in the Transmission and Development of Intellectual Sciences at the Najaf Seminary15717910322010.22059/jitp.2025.384996.523554FAMohammad MahdiKamaliAssistant Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, Islamic Research Foundation, Mashhad, Iran.0000-0003-2451-1879Journal Article20241125Khorasan, as one of Iran’s foremost centers of civilization and thought, has historically been home to two major philosophical schools: Mashhad and Sabzevar. Over the past two centuries, these schools have played a pivotal role in the transmission and development of Islamic philosophy (ḥikmah) and rational sciences. Notably, their profound influence on the Najaf Seminary—one of the most important Shi‘a scholarly centers—has been especially significant.
This study, employing a historical-geographical perspective and a descriptive-analytical methodology, systematically examines the extent and nature of this influence. The findings indicate that the impact of Khorasan’s philosophical schools on the Najaf Seminary can be discerned in several key areas:
• The integration of rational and traditional sciences;
• The strengthening of rational approaches within religious studies;
• The formation of the Shi‘a mystical-philosophical tradition in Najaf;
• The broadening of intellectual horizons;
• The training of a new generation of thinkers.
This dynamic intellectual interaction brought about a profound transformation in the Najaf Seminary’s intellectual environment and paved the way for the emergence of a new Shi‘a intellectual tradition. This tradition, characterized by a synthesis of philosophical rationality, mysticism, and jurisprudence, is today recognized as one of the most influential currents in the contemporary Islamic world.Khorasan, as one of Iran’s foremost centers of civilization and thought, has historically been home to two major philosophical schools: Mashhad and Sabzevar. Over the past two centuries, these schools have played a pivotal role in the transmission and development of Islamic philosophy (ḥikmah) and rational sciences. Notably, their profound influence on the Najaf Seminary—one of the most important Shi‘a scholarly centers—has been especially significant.
This study, employing a historical-geographical perspective and a descriptive-analytical methodology, systematically examines the extent and nature of this influence. The findings indicate that the impact of Khorasan’s philosophical schools on the Najaf Seminary can be discerned in several key areas:
• The integration of rational and traditional sciences;
• The strengthening of rational approaches within religious studies;
• The formation of the Shi‘a mystical-philosophical tradition in Najaf;
• The broadening of intellectual horizons;
• The training of a new generation of thinkers.
This dynamic intellectual interaction brought about a profound transformation in the Najaf Seminary’s intellectual environment and paved the way for the emergence of a new Shi‘a intellectual tradition. This tradition, characterized by a synthesis of philosophical rationality, mysticism, and jurisprudence, is today recognized as one of the most influential currents in the contemporary Islamic world.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_103220_d6e983a23f17f59affcc47ed47d18744.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258120250819Investigating the Efficiency of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Theory of Substantial Motion in Explaining the Transformation of Specific FormsInvestigating the Efficiency of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Theory of Substantial Motion in Explaining the Transformation of Specific Forms18320510322110.22059/jitp.2025.385731.523559FASaeedElahi NasabMA, Department of lamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Qom University, Qom, Iran.0009-0005-3191-9890Mohammad JavadZakaviMA, Department of lamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Qom University, Qom, Iran.0009-0000-2811-1544Journal Article20241123The phenomenon of the transformation of forms (istiḥālat al-ṣuwar), or more precisely, the substitution of one specific form (ṣūrah) with another in the material world, is an issue that demands philosophical inquiry. Drawing on his philosophical foundations, Mullā Ṣadrā presents a novel analysis of this phenomenon through his theory of substantial motion (al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyya), which allows for change within the physical substance (jawhar), while also offering a serious critique of the classical theory of generation and corruption (al-kawn wa al-fasād). This research seeks to address the central question: Does analysis of the transformation of forms —given his critique of and shortcomings regarding the theory of generation and corruption (al-kawn wa al-fasād) and in light of his doctrine of substantial motion —provide an effective philosophical explanation? To answer this question, the paper employs library-based research and content analysis methods, focusing on primary and secondary sources relevant to the topic. First, the classical theory of generation and corruption is reviewed, with particular attention to the views of Ibn Sīnā and the criticisms put forward by Mullā Ṣadrā. Then, Ṣadrā’s theory of substantial motion and its implications for the analysis of the transformation of forms are discussed. In conclusion, the findings indicate that while Mullā Ṣadrā’s account of the transformation of forms offers a fundamentally distinct approach compared to the traditional view of generation and corruption, it ultimately faces similar conceptual challenges to those he identified in the classical position.The phenomenon of the transformation of forms (istiḥālat al-ṣuwar), or more precisely, the substitution of one specific form (ṣūrah) with another in the material world, is an issue that demands philosophical inquiry. Drawing on his philosophical foundations, Mullā Ṣadrā presents a novel analysis of this phenomenon through his theory of substantial motion (al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyya), which allows for change within the physical substance (jawhar), while also offering a serious critique of the classical theory of generation and corruption (al-kawn wa al-fasād). This research seeks to address the central question: Does analysis of the transformation of forms —given his critique of and shortcomings regarding the theory of generation and corruption (al-kawn wa al-fasād) and in light of his doctrine of substantial motion —provide an effective philosophical explanation? To answer this question, the paper employs library-based research and content analysis methods, focusing on primary and secondary sources relevant to the topic. First, the classical theory of generation and corruption is reviewed, with particular attention to the views of Ibn Sīnā and the criticisms put forward by Mullā Ṣadrā. Then, Ṣadrā’s theory of substantial motion and its implications for the analysis of the transformation of forms are discussed. In conclusion, the findings indicate that while Mullā Ṣadrā’s account of the transformation of forms offers a fundamentally distinct approach compared to the traditional view of generation and corruption, it ultimately faces similar conceptual challenges to those he identified in the classical position.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_103221_26bb3de612b829fb5b33aea3193b0eba.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258120250819The Body Politic in Islamic Philosophy
The Human Body as Metaphor for the Ideal Household and the Perfect CityThe Body Politic in Islamic Philosophy
The Human Body as Metaphor for the Ideal Household and the Perfect City21123210322210.22059/jitp.2025.388640.523572FAMaryamNasr EsfahaniAssistant Professor, Department of Women’s Studies, Faculty of Social Studies, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran, Iran0000-0002-7346-2391Journal Article20250111The metaphorical representation of the human body as an ideal community stands among the oldest and most complex figures in political philosophy. By analogizing the human body with both micro- and macro-level human collectives, this metaphor provides a coherent framework for understanding social and political organization. Prominently, Muslim philosophers such as al-Fārābī and Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī —who mark the beginning and climax of medieval Islamic political thought—have utilized this analogy in their works. This article traces the discourse on the “body politic” from antiquity through the medieval period, highlighting seminal contributions by Muslim thinkers. Employing Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of “conceptual metaphor,” we examine the metaphor’s structure and conceptual network within the practical wisdom texts of Peripatetic philosophy. Additionally, the article discusses the stagnation in the metaphor’s development within Islamic political thought, contrasting this with its transformation in Western philosophy, where the “body politic” evolved from a structural analogy to a concept describing political collectivity. Ultimately, we argue that, due to the formative role of metaphors in shaping understanding and belief, the “body politic” metaphor serves as a powerful framework for analyzing contemporary political and social dynamics in Iran.The metaphorical representation of the human body as an ideal community stands among the oldest and most complex figures in political philosophy. By analogizing the human body with both micro- and macro-level human collectives, this metaphor provides a coherent framework for understanding social and political organization. Prominently, Muslim philosophers such as al-Fārābī and Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī —who mark the beginning and climax of medieval Islamic political thought—have utilized this analogy in their works. This article traces the discourse on the “body politic” from antiquity through the medieval period, highlighting seminal contributions by Muslim thinkers. Employing Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of “conceptual metaphor,” we examine the metaphor’s structure and conceptual network within the practical wisdom texts of Peripatetic philosophy. Additionally, the article discusses the stagnation in the metaphor’s development within Islamic political thought, contrasting this with its transformation in Western philosophy, where the “body politic” evolved from a structural analogy to a concept describing political collectivity. Ultimately, we argue that, due to the formative role of metaphors in shaping understanding and belief, the “body politic” metaphor serves as a powerful framework for analyzing contemporary political and social dynamics in Iran.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_103222_89fa665dd373ae531e51ca6c43db0a33.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258120250819The Evolution of the Concept of the Human Soul from Plato to Christian PhilosophyThe Evolution of the Concept of the Human Soul from Plato to Christian Philosophy23725910322310.22059/jitp.2025.389774.523580FAMohammad HosseinVafaiyanAssistant Professor, Department of Science and Technology Studies, Faculty of Management, Science and Technology, Amirkabir University of Technology, Tehran, Iran.0009-0005-5881-5258Journal Article20250204The study of the soul (psychology) is a subject that, although variably treated, remains prominent in Plato’s dialogues and constitutes a central theme in Aristotle’s philosophical inquiries. The ideas of these two thinkers were further developed by the Neoplatonists and subsequently by Christian philosophers, thereby laying the groundwork for the evolution of soul-related thought in two major traditions: Islamic philosophy after al-Fārābī, and modern philosophy after Descartes. The continuity and depth of these ideas, spanning from ancient Greece to these later traditions, are so significant that any attempt to understand recent theories about the soul without reference to their origins would be both inadequate and incomplete. This study, drawing upon logical analysis of the formulations presented by Plato, Aristotle, and their commentators—and their subsequent transmission into Christian philosophy—aims to provide a coherent and plausible account of the historical development of the concept of the human soul. The central question guiding this inquiry is how these philosophers conceptualized the soul during this historically dynamic period, characterized more by fluctuation and transformation than by uniformity, and how these conceptual shifts can be identified and explained.The study of the soul (psychology) is a subject that, although variably treated, remains prominent in Plato’s dialogues and constitutes a central theme in Aristotle’s philosophical inquiries. The ideas of these two thinkers were further developed by the Neoplatonists and subsequently by Christian philosophers, thereby laying the groundwork for the evolution of soul-related thought in two major traditions: Islamic philosophy after al-Fārābī, and modern philosophy after Descartes. The continuity and depth of these ideas, spanning from ancient Greece to these later traditions, are so significant that any attempt to understand recent theories about the soul without reference to their origins would be both inadequate and incomplete. This study, drawing upon logical analysis of the formulations presented by Plato, Aristotle, and their commentators—and their subsequent transmission into Christian philosophy—aims to provide a coherent and plausible account of the historical development of the concept of the human soul. The central question guiding this inquiry is how these philosophers conceptualized the soul during this historically dynamic period, characterized more by fluctuation and transformation than by uniformity, and how these conceptual shifts can be identified and explained.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_103223_3d86e2dab8fd15cae044c2e1b3860bad.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258120250819The Ontological Status of Conventional Affairs
An Ontological Formulation of the Theory of Conventional EntitiesThe Ontological Status of Conventional Affairs
An Ontological Formulation of the Theory of Conventional Entities26528610322410.22059/jitp.2025.392999.523596FAMadiAshooriDepartment of Educational Sciences, Farhangian University, Tehran, Iran0000-0001-6560-7688Journal Article20250428The theory of iʿtibārīyāt (conventional entities) has generally been regarded as an epistemological perspective aimed at explaining the content of performative and moral concepts and propositions, which argues that conventional cognitions lack referents. One of the foundational principles of this theory is that “conventional entities are grounded in realities.” This raises the question: What are these realities? Addressing this question requires an ontological perspective and formulation of the theory. According to the definition, convention (iʿtibār) consists in “ascribing the limit of one thing to another.” In an ontological account, existents are divided into real existents and conventional existents. To analyze this division, six elements are identified as essential to convention (iʿtibār), understood as an act. It is demonstrated that the realities referred to by ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī as the “real basis of convention” fall into three categories: (1) a reality that serves as the “origin of convention,” whose limit is ascribed to another thing; (2) an entity that, while having its own limit, serves as the “subject of convention” and receives the attributed limit; and (3) the resemblance or relation between the origin and the subject of convention that justifies the attribution of the original limit to the other, namely the “aspect of convention.” According to this analysis, the “conventional existent,” as the product of convention (iʿtibār), is a composite reality consisting of existence and a limit attributed by convention. In this article, by adopting the interpretation of quiddity (māhiyyah) as the “limit of existence” realized in the mind of the investigator, a coherent account of epistemological and ethical realism is presented.The theory of iʿtibārīyāt (conventional entities) has generally been regarded as an epistemological perspective aimed at explaining the content of performative and moral concepts and propositions, which argues that conventional cognitions lack referents. One of the foundational principles of this theory is that “conventional entities are grounded in realities.” This raises the question: What are these realities? Addressing this question requires an ontological perspective and formulation of the theory. According to the definition, convention (iʿtibār) consists in “ascribing the limit of one thing to another.” In an ontological account, existents are divided into real existents and conventional existents. To analyze this division, six elements are identified as essential to convention (iʿtibār), understood as an act. It is demonstrated that the realities referred to by ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī as the “real basis of convention” fall into three categories: (1) a reality that serves as the “origin of convention,” whose limit is ascribed to another thing; (2) an entity that, while having its own limit, serves as the “subject of convention” and receives the attributed limit; and (3) the resemblance or relation between the origin and the subject of convention that justifies the attribution of the original limit to the other, namely the “aspect of convention.” According to this analysis, the “conventional existent,” as the product of convention (iʿtibār), is a composite reality consisting of existence and a limit attributed by convention. In this article, by adopting the interpretation of quiddity (māhiyyah) as the “limit of existence” realized in the mind of the investigator, a coherent account of epistemological and ethical realism is presented.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_103224_a6069e22eb4cf6fac1ed955f48e6270e.pdfUnivrsity Of Tehran PressPhilosophy and Kalam2008-942258120250819A Historical Critique of Suhrawardī’s Genealogy of the Doctrine of Eternal ReturnA Historical Critique of Suhrawardī’s Genealogy of the Doctrine of Eternal Return28931610322510.22059/jitp.2025.391668.523588FAMahdiAzimiAssociate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.0000-0002-2394-152XJournal Article20250310Suhrawardī attributes the doctrine of “eternal return” to the ancient philosophies of Babylon, India, Iran, Greece, and Egypt, while also claiming to have formulated a novel proof for it. This study critically examines the accuracy of these attributions and the originality of his argument. The doctrine of eternal return is altogether absent from the recorded beliefs of Egyptian and Babylonian civilizations, though two related concepts—the Great Year and global cataclysms (flood/fire)—are present in Babylonian thought and were later integrated by Pythagoreans into cyclical cosmology. While Zoroastrianism itself does not contain the doctrine of eternal return, it does present a cyclical view of history that may have influenced Pythagorean formulations combining the ideas of repetition and infinity. Ancient Indian philosophy, by contrast, openly embraces the concept of eternal recurrence. Among Greek thinkers, Anaximander, the Pythagoreans, Empedocles, the Stoics, and Plotinus endorsed variant forms of this doctrine, whereas Heraclitus’s position remains ambiguous. The Atomists advocated for parallel infinite worlds rather than sequential cosmic cycles; Plato maintained the existence of a single universe; and Aristotle’s stance on the matter depends on the contentious authenticity of the Problemata. The core of Suhrawardī’s proof mirrors Plotinus’s Enneads, though the method of its elaboration may constitute Suhrawardī’s own contribution.Suhrawardī attributes the doctrine of “eternal return” to the ancient philosophies of Babylon, India, Iran, Greece, and Egypt, while also claiming to have formulated a novel proof for it. This study critically examines the accuracy of these attributions and the originality of his argument. The doctrine of eternal return is altogether absent from the recorded beliefs of Egyptian and Babylonian civilizations, though two related concepts—the Great Year and global cataclysms (flood/fire)—are present in Babylonian thought and were later integrated by Pythagoreans into cyclical cosmology. While Zoroastrianism itself does not contain the doctrine of eternal return, it does present a cyclical view of history that may have influenced Pythagorean formulations combining the ideas of repetition and infinity. Ancient Indian philosophy, by contrast, openly embraces the concept of eternal recurrence. Among Greek thinkers, Anaximander, the Pythagoreans, Empedocles, the Stoics, and Plotinus endorsed variant forms of this doctrine, whereas Heraclitus’s position remains ambiguous. The Atomists advocated for parallel infinite worlds rather than sequential cosmic cycles; Plato maintained the existence of a single universe; and Aristotle’s stance on the matter depends on the contentious authenticity of the Problemata. The core of Suhrawardī’s proof mirrors Plotinus’s Enneads, though the method of its elaboration may constitute Suhrawardī’s own contribution.https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_103225_9907a2ebae0e558529efa5ab9435b19b.pdf