Univrsity Of Tehran Press Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 57 2 2025 02 18 Defending the Critiques of Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi on Mulla Sadra’s Two Proofs for the Theory of the Union of the Intelligent and the Intelligible Defending the Critiques of Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi on Mulla Sadra’s Two Proofs for the Theory of the Union of the Intelligent and the Intelligible 313 328 99058 10.22059/jitp.2024.363278.523423 FA Ali Arshad Riahi Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Ahl-al-Bayt (Prophet’s Descendants) Studies, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran. Journal Article 2023 08 14 In an article, four critiques by Misbah of Mulla Sadra's argument of mutual correlation for proving the union of the intelligent and the intelligible, as well as one critique of his regarding the argument of light and darkness—which Mulla Sadra refers to within the context of the argument of mutual correlation without presenting it as an independent proof—have been critiqued. In the present article, which is written using an analytical-documentary method, an evaluation of these critiques reveals that none of them is valid. While Misbah’s statements exhibit some negligence, this can be easily clarified without undermining the essence of his critiques. Consequently, both premises of the argument of mutual correlation are found to be incorrect. The critique of the first premise posits that an intellectualized form, in the absence of an intelligent counterpart, is not inherently intellectualized. If the intellectualized form is considered an accident without its substratum (the intelligent), it cannot exist at all; therefore, an intellectualized form that does not exist cannot be deemed intellectualized. Thus, it cannot be asserted that the intellectualized form is inherently so, regardless of the existence of an intelligent counterpart. The critique of the second premise argues that the two mutually correlated entities are not coexistent. Furthermore, the argument of light and darkness is rejected, as the analogy of the soul to a blind eye is invalid. In an article, four critiques by Misbah of Mulla Sadra's argument of mutual correlation for proving the union of the intelligent and the intelligible, as well as one critique of his regarding the argument of light and darkness—which Mulla Sadra refers to within the context of the argument of mutual correlation without presenting it as an independent proof—have been critiqued. In the present article, which is written using an analytical-documentary method, an evaluation of these critiques reveals that none of them is valid. While Misbah’s statements exhibit some negligence, this can be easily clarified without undermining the essence of his critiques. Consequently, both premises of the argument of mutual correlation are found to be incorrect. The critique of the first premise posits that an intellectualized form, in the absence of an intelligent counterpart, is not inherently intellectualized. If the intellectualized form is considered an accident without its substratum (the intelligent), it cannot exist at all; therefore, an intellectualized form that does not exist cannot be deemed intellectualized. Thus, it cannot be asserted that the intellectualized form is inherently so, regardless of the existence of an intelligent counterpart. The critique of the second premise argues that the two mutually correlated entities are not coexistent. Furthermore, the argument of light and darkness is rejected, as the analogy of the soul to a blind eye is invalid. https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_99058_8554bcce14402965160b6e77e7738f17.pdf

Univrsity Of Tehran Press Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 57 2 2025 02 18 Revisiting Al-Kindi’s “Treatise on The Art of Dispelling Sorrows” in the Framework of Philosophy as a Way of Life Revisiting Al-Kindi’s “Treatise on The Art of Dispelling Sorrows” in the Framework of Philosophy as a Way of Life 333 348 99038 10.22059/jitp.2024.376417.523502 FA Seyed Amirreza Mazari PhD, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Law, Theology and Political science, Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2024 05 18 As the first Muslim philosopher, Al-Kindi developed a philosophical framework based on his monotheistic perspective, as evidenced by his surviving treatises. Although his philosophical system is eclectic, its religious framework clearly distinguishes it from his non-Muslim predecessors. This distinction becomes more apparent in his practical treatise on coping with sorrows. It seems that Al-Kindi’s philosophy can be considered a model of philosophy as a way of life. In the concept of philosophy as a way of life, pioneered by the French philosopher Pierre Hadot, a distinctive understanding of ancient philosophy is provided. This understanding can also be applied to the study of philosophy in the Islamic world. By examining Al-Kindi's philosophical system through Hadot’s perspective, a different understanding than previously thought may emerge. This research aims to analyze aspects of Al-Kindi’s way of life influenced by his monotheistic view, with a focus on his treatise. Initially, we will provide a brief overview of philosophy as a way of life and Stoic thought to revisit the ultimate goal of philosophy according to Al-Kindi. In the light of Hadot’s approach, we will analyze the similarities between Al-Kindi’s treatise and Stoic thought and then demonstrate that our approach to the fundamental difference in Al-Kindi's response to sorrow from the Stoics is based on his way of life. As the first Muslim philosopher, Al-Kindi developed a philosophical framework based on his monotheistic perspective, as evidenced by his surviving treatises. Although his philosophical system is eclectic, its religious framework clearly distinguishes it from his non-Muslim predecessors. This distinction becomes more apparent in his practical treatise on coping with sorrows. It seems that Al-Kindi’s philosophy can be considered a model of philosophy as a way of life. In the concept of philosophy as a way of life, pioneered by the French philosopher Pierre Hadot, a distinctive understanding of ancient philosophy is provided. This understanding can also be applied to the study of philosophy in the Islamic world. By examining Al-Kindi's philosophical system through Hadot’s perspective, a different understanding than previously thought may emerge. This research aims to analyze aspects of Al-Kindi’s way of life influenced by his monotheistic view, with a focus on his treatise. Initially, we will provide a brief overview of philosophy as a way of life and Stoic thought to revisit the ultimate goal of philosophy according to Al-Kindi. In the light of Hadot’s approach, we will analyze the similarities between Al-Kindi’s treatise and Stoic thought and then demonstrate that our approach to the fundamental difference in Al-Kindi's response to sorrow from the Stoics is based on his way of life. https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_99038_b8e47d547a81330cffb86889d6c9e341.pdf

Univrsity Of Tehran Press Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 57 2 2025 02 18 The Subject Matter of Metaphysics: A Significant Disagreement Between al-Farabi and Ibn Sina on the Logical Form of Existence The Subject Matter of Metaphysics: A Significant Disagreement Between al-Farabi and Ibn Sina on the Logical Form of Existence 353 372 99059 10.22059/jitp.2024.377388.523511 FA Davood Hosseini Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy and Logic, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2024 06 10 I argue that al-Farabi and Ibn Sina have a significant dispute regarding the analysis of the logical form of the subject matter of metaphysics: existence. al-Farabi asserts that "exist" has a disjunctive meaning, while Ibn Sina contends that it is a fundamental notion. I propose an explanation for this disagreement rooted in their differing views on the nature and structure of theoretical sciences. al-Farabi claims that theoretical sciences are mutually dependent, whereas Ibn Sina believes that higher-order sciences do not depend on lower-order ones, either in their subject matter or propositions. Based on these interpretations, I argue that the distinction between essence and existence poses a substantial problem within Ibn Sina’s framework, while it is considered trivial in al-Farabi’s metaphysics. This significant challenge in Ibn Sina’s thought elucidates the subsequent controversies in Islamic philosophy regarding this issue and the interpretation of Ibn Sina’s perspective. If my arguments hold, it suggests that Ibn Sina does not merely follow al-Farabi in metaphysics; rather, the evolution of Islamic philosophy marks a fundamental shift from al-Farabi to Ibn Sina. I argue that al-Farabi and Ibn Sina have a significant dispute regarding the analysis of the logical form of the subject matter of metaphysics: existence. al-Farabi asserts that "exist" has a disjunctive meaning, while Ibn Sina contends that it is a fundamental notion. I propose an explanation for this disagreement rooted in their differing views on the nature and structure of theoretical sciences. al-Farabi claims that theoretical sciences are mutually dependent, whereas Ibn Sina believes that higher-order sciences do not depend on lower-order ones, either in their subject matter or propositions. Based on these interpretations, I argue that the distinction between essence and existence poses a substantial problem within Ibn Sina’s framework, while it is considered trivial in al-Farabi’s metaphysics. This significant challenge in Ibn Sina’s thought elucidates the subsequent controversies in Islamic philosophy regarding this issue and the interpretation of Ibn Sina’s perspective. If my arguments hold, it suggests that Ibn Sina does not merely follow al-Farabi in metaphysics; rather, the evolution of Islamic philosophy marks a fundamental shift from al-Farabi to Ibn Sina. https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_99059_718d1c4ec97c6481f0f3a8cf67401095.pdf

Univrsity Of Tehran Press Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 57 2 2025 02 18 Ranking the Status of Contingent Beings Based on Two Approaches: "Attribute Scope" and "Existential Development" Ranking the Status of Contingent Beings Based on Two Approaches: "Attribute Scope" and "Existential Development" 377 402 99402 10.22059/jitp.2024.377985.523516 FA Ali Karimiyan Seyghalani Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Studies, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Guilan, Guilan, Iran. Journal Article 2024 06 16 There is a fundamental difference between the common philosophical approach influenced by Peripatetic philosophy and the philosophical view rooted in Sadrian philosophy regarding the "ranking of the status of contingent beings." The former, following an "attribute scope" approach, holds that the quantity of existential attributes in each species determines its rank. Since humans are considered the only rational beings encompassing the attributes of other species, they are positioned at the top of the hierarchy of contingent beings. Conversely, the latter approach, inspired by Sadrian philosophy, views "existential and intuitive development in supra-material realms" as the basis for ranking contingent beings. Adherents of this view, drawing on foundational principles of Sadrian thought such as "unity and simplicity of existence," "gradation in existence," and a unique interpretation of "trans-substantial motion," argue that each contingent being has the capacity to progress in the path of knowledge in the arc of ascension and within transcendent realms, achieving rank through the discovery of truths. This article, aiming to elucidate key arguments from both perspectives through content analysis, ultimately concludes that the first approach encounters numerous theological and philosophical challenges, including its reliance on premises that struggle to align with Quranic verses and Islamic traditions. By contrast, the second approach proves more congruent and compatible with these sources.<br />  There is a fundamental difference between the common philosophical approach influenced by Peripatetic philosophy and the philosophical view rooted in Sadrian philosophy regarding the "ranking of the status of contingent beings." The former, following an "attribute scope" approach, holds that the quantity of existential attributes in each species determines its rank. Since humans are considered the only rational beings encompassing the attributes of other species, they are positioned at the top of the hierarchy of contingent beings. Conversely, the latter approach, inspired by Sadrian philosophy, views "existential and intuitive development in supra-material realms" as the basis for ranking contingent beings. Adherents of this view, drawing on foundational principles of Sadrian thought such as "unity and simplicity of existence," "gradation in existence," and a unique interpretation of "trans-substantial motion," argue that each contingent being has the capacity to progress in the path of knowledge in the arc of ascension and within transcendent realms, achieving rank through the discovery of truths. This article, aiming to elucidate key arguments from both perspectives through content analysis, ultimately concludes that the first approach encounters numerous theological and philosophical challenges, including its reliance on premises that struggle to align with Quranic verses and Islamic traditions. By contrast, the second approach proves more congruent and compatible with these sources.<br />  https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_99402_c9a403c88f6d3c8acc9671a3b0373c90.pdf

Univrsity Of Tehran Press Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 57 2 2025 02 18 Quiddity-Based Property in All Ranks of Reality Quiddity-Based Property in All Ranks of Reality 405 421 100757 10.22059/jitp.2024.379359.523523 FA Javad Nazari Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Ilam, Ilam, Iran Golamreza Fayazi Professor, Department of Philosophy, The Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute, Qom, Iran. Journal Article 2024 07 13 The distinction between existence and quiddity, as well as the link between the two, has been a substantial issue in Islamic philosophy throughout history, having profound effects on other issues. Muslim philosophers argue that contingent beings possess both existence and quiddity in its narrow sense. However, many philosophers believe that Necessary Being (Wājib al-Wujūd) is devoid of quiddity and some deny the quiddity-based reality. Nonetheless, logical reasoning indicates that all ranks of the essence of things (including real and constructed (i‘tibārī), as well as existential and non-existential) are predicated on quiddity. Hence, first and foremost, it is not impossible to put forward an integrated analysis of existence and quiddity for Necessary Being, where quiddity, like existence, is limitless. Second, the copula notions (ma‘ānī rabaṭī) are quiddity-based, even if their quiddity, like their existence, is the quiddity for others. Third, non-existent matters are, in fact, distinct from one another. For example, while the non-existence of a vicious circle and a giant (ghūl) is the same in that they are both non-existent, their distinction stems from their adherence to their quiddity (the whatness of a vicious circle and a giant (ghūl). Fourth, constructed matters (umūr i‘tibārī) are similarly quiddity-based, though their quiddity, like their existence, is constructed (i‘tibārī). As a result, the property of being quiddity-based elevates to an existent qua existent axiom, becoming a direct accident comparable to reality. The distinction between existence and quiddity, as well as the link between the two, has been a substantial issue in Islamic philosophy throughout history, having profound effects on other issues. Muslim philosophers argue that contingent beings possess both existence and quiddity in its narrow sense. However, many philosophers believe that Necessary Being (Wājib al-Wujūd) is devoid of quiddity and some deny the quiddity-based reality. Nonetheless, logical reasoning indicates that all ranks of the essence of things (including real and constructed (i‘tibārī), as well as existential and non-existential) are predicated on quiddity. Hence, first and foremost, it is not impossible to put forward an integrated analysis of existence and quiddity for Necessary Being, where quiddity, like existence, is limitless. Second, the copula notions (ma‘ānī rabaṭī) are quiddity-based, even if their quiddity, like their existence, is the quiddity for others. Third, non-existent matters are, in fact, distinct from one another. For example, while the non-existence of a vicious circle and a giant (ghūl) is the same in that they are both non-existent, their distinction stems from their adherence to their quiddity (the whatness of a vicious circle and a giant (ghūl). Fourth, constructed matters (umūr i‘tibārī) are similarly quiddity-based, though their quiddity, like their existence, is constructed (i‘tibārī). As a result, the property of being quiddity-based elevates to an existent qua existent axiom, becoming a direct accident comparable to reality. https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_100757_202979b0aa7ec6e1dd59333ffee3deed.pdf

Univrsity Of Tehran Press Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 57 2 2025 02 18 The Theory of Graded Terms Al-Farabi and Avicenna’s Solution to an Aristotelian Challenge The Theory of Graded Terms Al-Farabi and Avicenna’s Solution to an Aristotelian Challenge 425 441 100758 10.22059/jitp.2024.380875.523532 FA Vahid Khademzadeh Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Wisdom, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran. Journal Article 2024 08 19 The theory of "graded terms" (alfāẓ-e mušakkik) has been a subject of considerable debate among Muslim philosophers. The roots of this theory can be traced back to Al-Farabi and Avicenna. This article investigates whether or not the theory of graded terms is a legacy of Aristotle and identifies the problem it seeks to address. Aristotle's perspective on terms, especially the term "being", is examined through his works and then compared with the views of Al-Farabi and Avicenna. Additionally, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi’s claim that this theory was also articulated by Greek philosophers is critically analyzed. Aristotle categorizes terms exclusively as either homonymous or synonymous and makes no mention of graded terms (mušakkik). Al-Farabi categorizes graded terms under synonymous terms, while Avicenna, in his Logic of the Healing (Mantiq al-Shifāʼ), places them under homonymous terms. Nonetheless, Avicenna does not consider graded terms to be purely homonyms. This study demonstrates that Aristotle’s categorization of terms proves inadequate in addressing certain terms like “being.” The theory of graded terms emerges as a solution to this challenge The theory of "graded terms" (alfāẓ-e mušakkik) has been a subject of considerable debate among Muslim philosophers. The roots of this theory can be traced back to Al-Farabi and Avicenna. This article investigates whether or not the theory of graded terms is a legacy of Aristotle and identifies the problem it seeks to address. Aristotle's perspective on terms, especially the term "being", is examined through his works and then compared with the views of Al-Farabi and Avicenna. Additionally, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi’s claim that this theory was also articulated by Greek philosophers is critically analyzed. Aristotle categorizes terms exclusively as either homonymous or synonymous and makes no mention of graded terms (mušakkik). Al-Farabi categorizes graded terms under synonymous terms, while Avicenna, in his Logic of the Healing (Mantiq al-Shifāʼ), places them under homonymous terms. Nonetheless, Avicenna does not consider graded terms to be purely homonyms. This study demonstrates that Aristotle’s categorization of terms proves inadequate in addressing certain terms like “being.” The theory of graded terms emerges as a solution to this challenge https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_100758_20e0e0c85f0eb0ea951688be987326a5.pdf

Univrsity Of Tehran Press Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 57 2 2025 02 18 A Comparative-Critical Study of the Ontological Foundations and Requirements of “Self-Transcendence Need” in the Thought of Abraham Maslow and Mulla Sadra A Comparative-Critical Study of the Ontological Foundations and Requirements of “Self-Transcendence Need” in the Thought of Abraham Maslow and Mulla Sadra 447 469 100760 10.22059/jitp.2024.380978.523533 FA Zahra Kalhor PhD Student, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Shiraz University, shiraz, Iran Abdol‌ali Shokr Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran. Saboura Haji-Ali Orakpour Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran Journal Article 2024 08 19 The fundamental issue of this research is the exploration of the ontological foundations of self-transcendence in the thought systems of Maslow and Mulla Sadra, with a focus on the principles of the degrees of reality and gradational unity. The aim is to uncover the implications that are significant for developing a transcendental philosophy and a perfectionistic psychology. This study, drawing on epistemological criteria of coherence and, in some cases, foundationalism, as well as employing a comparative-critical method with the use of deductive reasoning and historical analysis, concludes that the principle of the degrees of reality, also known as the principle of continuity in Maslow's theory, which is derived from the metaphysics of Plotinian Bergsonism, connects with the principle of complementarity of Bohr and the principle of uncertainty of Heisenberg, tying into Whitehead’s metaphysical principle of discontinuity. This integration leads Maslow’s concept of self-transcendence to encompass not only a collective and other-centered aspect but also an individual, elitist, and self-centered dimension. However, the gradational unity in Mulla Sadra's system, emphasizing the primacy of existence, which eradicates multiplicities, replaces the discrete, particle-like image of existence’s elements with a continuous, wave-like extension of the world’s components. This shifts self-transcendence from an individual and autonomous matter to a collective, deterministic, and other-dependent phenomenon. Although Mulla Sadra, due to his awareness of the internal contradictions within the principle of gradational unity, turns away from traditional causality and halts the process of ascendant movement by presenting the theory of existential poverty and the pursuit of personal unity, he still, considering the implications of the principle of perfection, portrays self-transcendence as inherent in both human beings and the world. He imbues the theory of existential poverty and ascendant movement with an epistemological dimension. The fundamental issue of this research is the exploration of the ontological foundations of self-transcendence in the thought systems of Maslow and Mulla Sadra, with a focus on the principles of the degrees of reality and gradational unity. The aim is to uncover the implications that are significant for developing a transcendental philosophy and a perfectionistic psychology. This study, drawing on epistemological criteria of coherence and, in some cases, foundationalism, as well as employing a comparative-critical method with the use of deductive reasoning and historical analysis, concludes that the principle of the degrees of reality, also known as the principle of continuity in Maslow's theory, which is derived from the metaphysics of Plotinian Bergsonism, connects with the principle of complementarity of Bohr and the principle of uncertainty of Heisenberg, tying into Whitehead’s metaphysical principle of discontinuity. This integration leads Maslow’s concept of self-transcendence to encompass not only a collective and other-centered aspect but also an individual, elitist, and self-centered dimension. However, the gradational unity in Mulla Sadra's system, emphasizing the primacy of existence, which eradicates multiplicities, replaces the discrete, particle-like image of existence’s elements with a continuous, wave-like extension of the world’s components. This shifts self-transcendence from an individual and autonomous matter to a collective, deterministic, and other-dependent phenomenon. Although Mulla Sadra, due to his awareness of the internal contradictions within the principle of gradational unity, turns away from traditional causality and halts the process of ascendant movement by presenting the theory of existential poverty and the pursuit of personal unity, he still, considering the implications of the principle of perfection, portrays self-transcendence as inherent in both human beings and the world. He imbues the theory of existential poverty and ascendant movement with an epistemological dimension. https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_100760_b526e0051f05279726d4d3796f86d84b.pdf

Univrsity Of Tehran Press Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 57 2 2025 02 18 An Evaluation of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi’s Dispute with Islamic Philosophy on the Issue of the Minority of Evils An Evaluation of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi’s Dispute with Islamic Philosophy on the Issue of the Minority of Evils 475 492 100761 10.22059/jitp.2024.376425.523503 FA Majid Ahsan Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2024 05 13 The problem of evil and how it is incorporated into divine decrees is one of the most significant issues in Islamic philosophy. One of the most well-known responses to this issue is the theory of the fivefold division of beings attributed to Aristotle by Muslim philosophers. According to this view, evils are a necessary and inseparable part of the material world. Therefore, despite the possibility of such evils occurring, the world should still be created, as avoiding these minor evils is only possible by not creating the world at all—a solution that Islamic philosophers consider equivalent to abandoning immense good and committing significant evil. Through a deductive and a priori argument, they attempt to demonstrate, using quantitative calculations, how evils are minimal compared to goods in both human and non-human realms. In contrast, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, by criticizing Islamic philosophy on this matter, argues that evils are not an inevitable part of the world, nor is refraining from creating the world to avoid these evils a significant evil. Using an inductive and empirical approach, similar to Islamic philosophers, he tries to show through quantitative calculations that most humans suffer from numerous evils and are deprived of various pleasures. Thus, contrary to the numerical calculations of Muslim philosophers, the claim that goods are predominant is false. This paper, structured through a descriptive-analytical approach, primarily focuses on Ibn Sīnā 's perspectives to present the view of Islamic philosophy and then examines Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī 's critiques. Ultimately, it demonstrates that while Fakhr al-Razi fundamentally disagrees with Muslim philosophers on the rationale behind the existence of evils in the world, they share a common limitation in lacking or neglecting a qualitative and human-centric perspective in analyzing this issue. The problem of evil and how it is incorporated into divine decrees is one of the most significant issues in Islamic philosophy. One of the most well-known responses to this issue is the theory of the fivefold division of beings attributed to Aristotle by Muslim philosophers. According to this view, evils are a necessary and inseparable part of the material world. Therefore, despite the possibility of such evils occurring, the world should still be created, as avoiding these minor evils is only possible by not creating the world at all—a solution that Islamic philosophers consider equivalent to abandoning immense good and committing significant evil. Through a deductive and a priori argument, they attempt to demonstrate, using quantitative calculations, how evils are minimal compared to goods in both human and non-human realms. In contrast, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, by criticizing Islamic philosophy on this matter, argues that evils are not an inevitable part of the world, nor is refraining from creating the world to avoid these evils a significant evil. Using an inductive and empirical approach, similar to Islamic philosophers, he tries to show through quantitative calculations that most humans suffer from numerous evils and are deprived of various pleasures. Thus, contrary to the numerical calculations of Muslim philosophers, the claim that goods are predominant is false. This paper, structured through a descriptive-analytical approach, primarily focuses on Ibn Sīnā 's perspectives to present the view of Islamic philosophy and then examines Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī 's critiques. Ultimately, it demonstrates that while Fakhr al-Razi fundamentally disagrees with Muslim philosophers on the rationale behind the existence of evils in the world, they share a common limitation in lacking or neglecting a qualitative and human-centric perspective in analyzing this issue. https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_100761_7acbdfba4f37e3914fdd61d612290c76.pdf

Univrsity Of Tehran Press Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 57 2 2025 02 18 A Critique of William Rowe’s Perspective on the “Begging the Question” Nature of the Modal Ontological Argument A Critique of William Rowe’s Perspective on the “Begging the Question” Nature of the Modal Ontological Argument 497 513 100762 10.22059/jitp.2024.378216.523518 FA Mohammadamin Khodamoradi MA Student, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2024 06 18 This research investigates and critiques William Rowe’s objection to Plantinga’s modal ontological argument using a descriptive-analytical approach. According to Plantinga, God is defined as a maximally great being—a being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent in all possible worlds. Plantinga’s argument holds that, since the existence of such a being is possible, it must follow that this being exists in the actual world. The key premise of this argument, known as the "possibility premise," asserts that God's existence is not impossible. William Rowe argues that Plantinga’s argument epistemologically commits the fallacy of "begging the question." Rowe claims that the only way to affirm the possibility premise—the possibility of God’s existence—is by already accepting the conclusion that God exists in the actual world. This research provides a detailed analysis of Rowe’s objection and argues that his claim—that the modal ontological argument begs the question—is inconsistent with his own criteria for identifying this fallacy. Furthermore, as some of Rowe’s critics have pointed out, his reasoning would imply that all valid arguments are guilty of begging the question, which is evidently false. Consequently, Rowe fails to demonstrate that the modal ontological argument commits the fallacy of begging the question. This research investigates and critiques William Rowe’s objection to Plantinga’s modal ontological argument using a descriptive-analytical approach. According to Plantinga, God is defined as a maximally great being—a being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent in all possible worlds. Plantinga’s argument holds that, since the existence of such a being is possible, it must follow that this being exists in the actual world. The key premise of this argument, known as the "possibility premise," asserts that God's existence is not impossible. William Rowe argues that Plantinga’s argument epistemologically commits the fallacy of "begging the question." Rowe claims that the only way to affirm the possibility premise—the possibility of God’s existence—is by already accepting the conclusion that God exists in the actual world. This research provides a detailed analysis of Rowe’s objection and argues that his claim—that the modal ontological argument begs the question—is inconsistent with his own criteria for identifying this fallacy. Furthermore, as some of Rowe’s critics have pointed out, his reasoning would imply that all valid arguments are guilty of begging the question, which is evidently false. Consequently, Rowe fails to demonstrate that the modal ontological argument commits the fallacy of begging the question. https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_100762_fc9abb4d76f971515c6a7880f0a57535.pdf

Univrsity Of Tehran Press Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 57 2 2025 02 18 Three Levels of “Universal” and “Particular” Based on Three Philosophical Approaches (Quiddity Correspondence, Gradational Inclusion in Existential Levels, The Encompassing of Divine Being over Manifestations) Three Levels of “Universal” and “Particular” Based on Three Philosophical Approaches (Quiddity Correspondence, Gradational Inclusion in Existential Levels, The Encompassing of Divine Being over Manifestations) 519 541 100763 10.22059/jitp.2024.380637.523531 FA Mahdi Saadatmand Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Studies, Faculty of Theology, Yazd University, Yazd, Iran. Ali Babaei Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Science, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran. Journal Article 2024 08 18 The discussion of "universal" and "particular" is a significant and pervasive topic across both mental and objective realms. This concept extends from essence to existence, making it an inseparable and decisive part of any philosophical school. A key question arises: How do the meanings and implications of "universal" and "particular" change with shifts in philosophical foundations? In the quiddity view, universals and particulars are confined to conceptual and quiddity domains. The individuation of each particular depends on a quiddity subsumed under a broader universal concept. Different types of universals are the results of various quiddity considerations. However, with a shift toward the doctrine of the primacy and gradational unity of existence, the roles of universals and particulars extend beyond quiddity correspondence. Existence, while inherently particular and individualized, universally encompasses all existential levels. Each higher level of existence embodies the truth of the lower, while each lower existence represents a refinement of the higher. Finally, in the third journey, the particular, in its specific meaning, signifies the encompassing nature of a personal existential reality over its manifestations. The universal, on the other hand, refers to the gradational and expansive manifestation of existence encompassing divine appearances. Thus, universality and particularity are conceptual considerations that vary depending on differing perspectives in ontology, whether they pertain to essence, existence, or their related dimensions. The discussion of "universal" and "particular" is a significant and pervasive topic across both mental and objective realms. This concept extends from essence to existence, making it an inseparable and decisive part of any philosophical school. A key question arises: How do the meanings and implications of "universal" and "particular" change with shifts in philosophical foundations? In the quiddity view, universals and particulars are confined to conceptual and quiddity domains. The individuation of each particular depends on a quiddity subsumed under a broader universal concept. Different types of universals are the results of various quiddity considerations. However, with a shift toward the doctrine of the primacy and gradational unity of existence, the roles of universals and particulars extend beyond quiddity correspondence. Existence, while inherently particular and individualized, universally encompasses all existential levels. Each higher level of existence embodies the truth of the lower, while each lower existence represents a refinement of the higher. Finally, in the third journey, the particular, in its specific meaning, signifies the encompassing nature of a personal existential reality over its manifestations. The universal, on the other hand, refers to the gradational and expansive manifestation of existence encompassing divine appearances. Thus, universality and particularity are conceptual considerations that vary depending on differing perspectives in ontology, whether they pertain to essence, existence, or their related dimensions. https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_100763_4cf0393102b71af83696b85fb517ade3.pdf

Univrsity Of Tehran Press Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 57 2 2025 02 18 Quran-Based Criticism of Ibn Arabi’s Interpretations of the Verses Concerning the People of Prophet Noah (PBUH) in Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam Quran-Based Criticism of Ibn Arabi’s Interpretations of the Verses Concerning the People of Prophet Noah (PBUH) in Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam 545 562 100765 10.22059/jitp.2025.364624.523427 FA Mahmoud Saidiy Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Wisdom, Faculty of Humanities, Shahed University, Tehran, Iran. Hasan Asgharpour Associate Professor, Department of Quran and Hadith, Faculty of Humanities, Shahed University, Tehran, Iran 0000-0001-7779-0483 Journal Article 2024 02 25 The Noahian chapter (Fasṣ al-Nūḥī) is one of the most significant sections of Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, in which Ibn Arabi examines and interprets the verses related to Prophet Noah (PBUH) and his people. Completely departing from the literal and explicit meanings of the Quranic verses, Ibn Arabi asserts that the people of Noah were not idol worshippers but rather individuals who experienced divine manifestations and inner spiritual visions. According to him, they possessed two mystical states: tashbīh (anthropomorphism) and tanzīh (transcendence). They witnessed God's manifestation in all forms and creations while believing in His transcendence beyond flaws and deficiencies. Ibn Arabi also claimed that Prophet Noah (PBUH) solely invited them to the transcendent aspect of God (tanzīh), which led to their rejection of his message. This descriptive-analytical study demonstrates that such hierarchical (ṭūlī) interpretations are incompatible with the explicit and apparent meanings of the Quran and contradict the relationship between the apparent and hidden meanings. The Quran explicitly describes Noah’s people as idol worshippers, and it is clear that Prophet Noah spared no effort in guiding them toward faith. Given their idol worship, it is certainly inaccurate to attribute mystical experiences or divine manifestations to them. Even if they had such attributes or spiritual ranks, the call to monotheism by Noah would have been meaningless. The Noahian chapter (Fasṣ al-Nūḥī) is one of the most significant sections of Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, in which Ibn Arabi examines and interprets the verses related to Prophet Noah (PBUH) and his people. Completely departing from the literal and explicit meanings of the Quranic verses, Ibn Arabi asserts that the people of Noah were not idol worshippers but rather individuals who experienced divine manifestations and inner spiritual visions. According to him, they possessed two mystical states: tashbīh (anthropomorphism) and tanzīh (transcendence). They witnessed God's manifestation in all forms and creations while believing in His transcendence beyond flaws and deficiencies. Ibn Arabi also claimed that Prophet Noah (PBUH) solely invited them to the transcendent aspect of God (tanzīh), which led to their rejection of his message. This descriptive-analytical study demonstrates that such hierarchical (ṭūlī) interpretations are incompatible with the explicit and apparent meanings of the Quran and contradict the relationship between the apparent and hidden meanings. The Quran explicitly describes Noah’s people as idol worshippers, and it is clear that Prophet Noah spared no effort in guiding them toward faith. Given their idol worship, it is certainly inaccurate to attribute mystical experiences or divine manifestations to them. Even if they had such attributes or spiritual ranks, the call to monotheism by Noah would have been meaningless. https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_100765_9095e10f20e41050d1a73ee6f724e0f3.pdf

Univrsity Of Tehran Press Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 57 2 2025 02 18 The Soul as the Sum of All Faculties A Principle and Multiple Interpretations The Soul as the Sum of All Faculties A Principle and Multiple Interpretations 567 585 100766 10.22059/jitp.2025.374257.523491 FA Javad Soufi PhD Student, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran Ghasemali Kouchnani Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2024 04 22 The relationship between the soul and the body has been one of the great philosophical enigmas throughout the history of philosophy. This conundrum arises from the assertion that an immaterial and incorporeal substance interacts with a material entity, engaging in reciprocal influence. Peripatetics, including Avicenna, sought to resolve this issue by positing the existence of multiple faculties that serve as intermediaries between the soul and the body. In contrast, thinkers like Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī critiqued the arguments for the existence of such faculties, rejecting them and instead positing the soul as the agent of all human actions. However, despite their rejection of intermediaries termed "faculties," they did not offer a satisfactory explanation for the interaction between the immaterial and the material. Mullā Ṣadrā, while accepting the existence of faculties, provided a unique interpretation based on his philosophical principles, particularly the gradation of existence. He identified the actions of the faculties with the actions of the soul itself, offering a novel exposition of the principle "The soul is the sum of all faculties". This study argues that neither proponents of the faculties' existence nor their detractors have clarified whether they affirm or deny faculties as primary intelligibles or secondary intelligibles. If the denial pertains to faculties as primary intelligibles and essential concepts, the rejection is justified. However, if the affirmation pertains to faculties as secondary intelligibles, the proponents of their existence hold the valid position. Moreover, we contend that even with the rejection of faculties, the interaction between the soul and the material body can be resolved through the soul's intermediary immateriality (tajarrud barzakhī). The relationship between the soul and the body has been one of the great philosophical enigmas throughout the history of philosophy. This conundrum arises from the assertion that an immaterial and incorporeal substance interacts with a material entity, engaging in reciprocal influence. Peripatetics, including Avicenna, sought to resolve this issue by positing the existence of multiple faculties that serve as intermediaries between the soul and the body. In contrast, thinkers like Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī critiqued the arguments for the existence of such faculties, rejecting them and instead positing the soul as the agent of all human actions. However, despite their rejection of intermediaries termed "faculties," they did not offer a satisfactory explanation for the interaction between the immaterial and the material. Mullā Ṣadrā, while accepting the existence of faculties, provided a unique interpretation based on his philosophical principles, particularly the gradation of existence. He identified the actions of the faculties with the actions of the soul itself, offering a novel exposition of the principle "The soul is the sum of all faculties". This study argues that neither proponents of the faculties' existence nor their detractors have clarified whether they affirm or deny faculties as primary intelligibles or secondary intelligibles. If the denial pertains to faculties as primary intelligibles and essential concepts, the rejection is justified. However, if the affirmation pertains to faculties as secondary intelligibles, the proponents of their existence hold the valid position. Moreover, we contend that even with the rejection of faculties, the interaction between the soul and the material body can be resolved through the soul's intermediary immateriality (tajarrud barzakhī). https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_100766_a8198133d2455a7e71b2f14023be3482.pdf