Univrsity Of Tehran Press Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 57 1 2024 08 22 Examining Avicenna’s Concept of the Soul’s Immateriality in the Context of Physicalism Critique Examining Avicenna’s Concept of the Soul’s Immateriality in the Context of Physicalism Critique 209 233 98345 10.22059/jitp.2024.371341.523472 FA Faranak Bahmani Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Studies, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Yasouj University, Yasouj, Iran Delbar Shuja Abajlu Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Studies, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Urmia University, Orumieh, Iran. Journal Article 2024 01 19 Two general perspectives have been proposed regarding the existential realms of human beings. Proponents of the first perspective believe in two existential realms: the immaterial essence (soul) and the material body, attributing human actions primarily to the immaterial essence. Followers of the second perspective consider humans to be unidimensional and confined to physical existence, reducing all human actions to their physicality, especially the brain, and denying any immaterial essence. The present study aims to elucidate the first perspective by examining Avicenna's notion of the soul's immateriality in the context of critiquing the second perspective. The research method is descriptive-analytical. The findings and results indicate that Avicenna, by presenting elements of proof and various arguments, has endeavored to substantiate the immateriality of the soul through an explanation of the soul's actions. Accordingly, in Avicenna's paradigm, the immateriality of the soul is based on three pillars: intellect, immanence, and independence. Physicalists believe that the belief in an essence independent of the body to explain and understand human perceptions arises from a lack of sufficient awareness regarding the brain's and nervous system's functions and complexities. Furthermore, the claim that bodily changes are due to the body's instrumental relationship with the soul is unprovable. Thus, the denial and critiques of physicalists are formed around three axes: the capability of the brain and nervous system, the ambiguity of philosophy in logically explaining the soul-body relationship, and cognitive ignorance. Avicenna, with seven arguments in proving the immateriality of the soul, responds to the corresponding physicalist critiques. However, two physicalist objections remain ambiguous in Avicenna's paradigm: the inexplicability of the soul-body connection and the objection based on the premise of intuitive understanding. Two general perspectives have been proposed regarding the existential realms of human beings. Proponents of the first perspective believe in two existential realms: the immaterial essence (soul) and the material body, attributing human actions primarily to the immaterial essence. Followers of the second perspective consider humans to be unidimensional and confined to physical existence, reducing all human actions to their physicality, especially the brain, and denying any immaterial essence. The present study aims to elucidate the first perspective by examining Avicenna's notion of the soul's immateriality in the context of critiquing the second perspective. The research method is descriptive-analytical. The findings and results indicate that Avicenna, by presenting elements of proof and various arguments, has endeavored to substantiate the immateriality of the soul through an explanation of the soul's actions. Accordingly, in Avicenna's paradigm, the immateriality of the soul is based on three pillars: intellect, immanence, and independence. Physicalists believe that the belief in an essence independent of the body to explain and understand human perceptions arises from a lack of sufficient awareness regarding the brain's and nervous system's functions and complexities. Furthermore, the claim that bodily changes are due to the body's instrumental relationship with the soul is unprovable. Thus, the denial and critiques of physicalists are formed around three axes: the capability of the brain and nervous system, the ambiguity of philosophy in logically explaining the soul-body relationship, and cognitive ignorance. Avicenna, with seven arguments in proving the immateriality of the soul, responds to the corresponding physicalist critiques. However, two physicalist objections remain ambiguous in Avicenna's paradigm: the inexplicability of the soul-body connection and the objection based on the premise of intuitive understanding. https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_98345_fbd398a99bf34752b77969a4f4b44308.pdf