Univrsity Of Tehran Press Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 57 1 2024 08 22 The Epistemic Presumption in the Question of God’s Existence The Epistemic Presumption in the Question of God’s Existence 59 77 96701 10.22059/jitp.2024.370345.523466 FA GholamHossein Javadpoor Assistant Professor, Department of Kalam, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2023 12 29 Evidentialism posits that the epistemic value of propositions lies in their evidence. However, alternative approaches, independent of evidential support, have emerged to maintain validity when competing viewpoints falter. This phenomenon, often termed "epistemic presumption," serves as both a procedural starting point and occasionally holds substantive truth-value. In discussions surrounding the existence of God, differing presumptions—whether theism, atheism, or non-belief—are contentious. Theists and atheists assert positive claims necessitating evidence, while agnostics posit that both positions lack support, contingent upon evidence provision. Thus, the burden of proof rests upon all three perspectives. Evidentialism posits that the epistemic value of propositions lies in their evidence. However, alternative approaches, independent of evidential support, have emerged to maintain validity when competing viewpoints falter. This phenomenon, often termed "epistemic presumption," serves as both a procedural starting point and occasionally holds substantive truth-value. In discussions surrounding the existence of God, differing presumptions—whether theism, atheism, or non-belief—are contentious. Theists and atheists assert positive claims necessitating evidence, while agnostics posit that both positions lack support, contingent upon evidence provision. Thus, the burden of proof rests upon all three perspectives. https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_96701_7d0792143e9f95872131dbcbf0dff6d8.pdf