Univrsity Of Tehran Press Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 56 1 2023 09 19 A Comparative Study of Mulla Sadra and Avicenna’s Views on the Self-Evidence of External World A Comparative Study of Mulla Sadra and Avicenna’s Views on the Self-Evidence of External World 167 180 94060 10.22059/jitp.2023.356003.523404 FA Reza Hasannourani PhD student of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology, Shahid Madani University of Azerbaijan, Tabriz, Iran Sohrab Haghighat Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology, Shahid Madani University of Azerbaijan, Tabriz, Iran Gholamhossein Ahmadiahangar Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology, Shahid Madani University of Azerbaijan, Tabriz, Iran Journal Article 2023 03 04 Muslim philosophers have regarded sensations, also known as propositions concerning the external world, as secondary self-evident propositions. According to Avicenna, although these secondary self-evident propositions are open to debate, they do not require further argumentation and are therefore considered self-evident. However, Mulla Sadra posits that real self-evident propositions are exclusive to "primary self-evident propositions," while secondary self-evident propositions are inherently "theoretical." Consequently, Avicenna deems the external world to be self-evident, whereas Sadra perceives it as theoretical and in need of proof. Our aim is to demonstrate that not only is Avicenna's perspective contradictory, but it also necessitates relativity and gradation of self-evident propositions, both of which are untenable. We concur with Sadra's viewpoint that secondary self-evident propositions are not truly self-evident but rather theoretical. Moreover, we reject the notion of relativity and gradation in self-evident propositions, affirming that genuine self-evident propositions are exclusive to "primary self-evident propositions" and that the existence of the external world is theoretical, requiring proof. This article employs an analytical-comparative-critical approach.  Muslim philosophers have regarded sensations, also known as propositions concerning the external world, as secondary self-evident propositions. According to Avicenna, although these secondary self-evident propositions are open to debate, they do not require further argumentation and are therefore considered self-evident. However, Mulla Sadra posits that real self-evident propositions are exclusive to "primary self-evident propositions," while secondary self-evident propositions are inherently "theoretical." Consequently, Avicenna deems the external world to be self-evident, whereas Sadra perceives it as theoretical and in need of proof. Our aim is to demonstrate that not only is Avicenna's perspective contradictory, but it also necessitates relativity and gradation of self-evident propositions, both of which are untenable. We concur with Sadra's viewpoint that secondary self-evident propositions are not truly self-evident but rather theoretical. Moreover, we reject the notion of relativity and gradation in self-evident propositions, affirming that genuine self-evident propositions are exclusive to "primary self-evident propositions" and that the existence of the external world is theoretical, requiring proof. This article employs an analytical-comparative-critical approach.  https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_94060_b0052df88656f1e4ac4ad5d9ff29e2dd.pdf