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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>Univrsity Of Tehran Press</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophy and Kalam</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-9422</Issn>
				<Volume>54</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2021</Year>
					<Month>08</Month>
					<Day>23</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>A Comparative Study of the Introspective Arguments of Mullā Ṣadrā and John Foster for the Immateriality of the Soul</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>A Comparative Study of the Introspective Arguments of Mullā Ṣadrā and John Foster for the Immateriality of the Soul</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>119</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>103</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">83541</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22059/jitp.2021.304921.523205</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Hamid Reza</FirstName>
					<LastName>Abdoli Mehrjardi</LastName>
<Affiliation>PhD Candidate,  University of Isfahan;</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Foroogh Al Sadat</FirstName>
					<LastName>Rahim Poor</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Isfahan;</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Amir Ehsan</FirstName>
					<LastName>Karbasizedeh</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate Professor, Department of Western Philosophy, University of Isfahan;</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>06</Month>
					<Day>27</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Some philosophers consider human and its mind purely material. In contrast, another group believes in an immaterial substance interacting with the body. Mullā Ṣadrā and John Foster, the British philosopher who was his contemporary, are among those who have independently argued for the immateriality of the soul. In this paper, we look at some of their arguments on the immateriality of the soul which are introspective; i.e., the arguments which emphasize direct attention to the soul or the inner and non-material consciousness of man. The methods of the two philosophers in reasoning are different. Foster focuses directly on man&#039;s inner awareness of his mental states, and Mullā Ṣadrā bases his arguments on comparing the properties of the soul with the body. Introspective arguments are effective in that they can, easily and without numerous premises, refer any human being to his or her inner self and make him believe in the immateriality of the soul. Of course, Mullā Ṣadrā and Foster did not pay any attention to the problems of introspection. Before putting forward this type of argument, the infallibility of access to mental states and the correctness of initial intuitions must be proven.  
 </Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Some philosophers consider human and its mind purely material. In contrast, another group believes in an immaterial substance interacting with the body. Mullā Ṣadrā and John Foster, the British philosopher who was his contemporary, are among those who have independently argued for the immateriality of the soul. In this paper, we look at some of their arguments on the immateriality of the soul which are introspective; i.e., the arguments which emphasize direct attention to the soul or the inner and non-material consciousness of man. The methods of the two philosophers in reasoning are different. Foster focuses directly on man&#039;s inner awareness of his mental states, and Mullā Ṣadrā bases his arguments on comparing the properties of the soul with the body. Introspective arguments are effective in that they can, easily and without numerous premises, refer any human being to his or her inner self and make him believe in the immateriality of the soul. Of course, Mullā Ṣadrā and Foster did not pay any attention to the problems of introspection. Before putting forward this type of argument, the infallibility of access to mental states and the correctness of initial intuitions must be proven.  
 </OtherAbstract>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Mullā Ṣadrā</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">John Foster</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Mind</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">soul</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">introspection</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Immateriality</Param>
			</Object>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_83541_f4a3d8e21c3c2fa44a1601976149aa3c.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>
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