Univrsity Of Tehran Press Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 52 1 2019 06 22 A Defense of Psychologism about the Nature of Evidence A Defense of Psychologism about the Nature of Evidence 37 56 71638 10.22059/jitp.2019.255719.523018 FA Muhammad Ali Poudineh Ph.D. Student of Philosophy, Farabi Pardis, University of Tehran Mansour Nasiri Associate Professor, Farabi Pardis, University of Tehran Journal Article 2018 05 09 One of the important concepts in epistemology is the that of evidence. Evidence is a kind of reason that is indicative of the truth of the proposition that is the object of one’s doxastic attitude. In this paper, we assess the nature of evidence. There are three important views on the nature of evidence: psychologism, factive propositionalism and non-factive propositionalism. After explaining and assessing the arguments for the three views, we come to the conclusion that the arguments for psychologism is stronger than the ones for propositionalism. So, it seems that the evidence is one’s non-factive mental states. One of the important concepts in epistemology is the that of evidence. Evidence is a kind of reason that is indicative of the truth of the proposition that is the object of one’s doxastic attitude. In this paper, we assess the nature of evidence. There are three important views on the nature of evidence: psychologism, factive propositionalism and non-factive propositionalism. After explaining and assessing the arguments for the three views, we come to the conclusion that the arguments for psychologism is stronger than the ones for propositionalism. So, it seems that the evidence is one’s non-factive mental states. https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_71638_9603f7ea05cd2d777c5becee7c2079fc.pdf