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<ArticleSet>
<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Tehran</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophy and Kalam</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-9422</Issn>
				<Volume>50</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2017</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The Analysis and Evaluation of the Conservativeness in Inferentialism Theory of Meaning</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>The Analysis and Evaluation of the Conservativeness in Inferentialism Theory of Meaning</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>119</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>133</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">62337</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22059/jitp.2017.62337</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Morteza</FirstName>
					<LastName>Mezginejad</LastName>
<Affiliation></Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0001-7571-3476</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Lotfolah</FirstName>
					<LastName>Nabavi</LastName>
<Affiliation></Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Seyyed Mohammad Ali</FirstName>
					<LastName>Hodjati</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate Professor</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>07</Month>
					<Day>02</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>The logical constants are defined by operational rules in the inferentialism theory of meaning. Arthur Prior’s counterexample (Tonk) makes a major challenge for the inferentialism. He shows that every arbitrary operational rule can describe a logical constant and this makes logical constants defective and incompatible with the system. In response to this problem, Belnap Offers conservativeness and uniqueness requirements for the operational rules. In this paper, we have evaluated the conservativeness requirement. The main question investigated is “how the conservativeness as a criterion provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for logical constant definition?” The hypothesis that we are to establish is the inability to achieve the definition of logical constant by conservativeness requirement.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">The logical constants are defined by operational rules in the inferentialism theory of meaning. Arthur Prior’s counterexample (Tonk) makes a major challenge for the inferentialism. He shows that every arbitrary operational rule can describe a logical constant and this makes logical constants defective and incompatible with the system. In response to this problem, Belnap Offers conservativeness and uniqueness requirements for the operational rules. In this paper, we have evaluated the conservativeness requirement. The main question investigated is “how the conservativeness as a criterion provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for logical constant definition?” The hypothesis that we are to establish is the inability to achieve the definition of logical constant by conservativeness requirement.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Conservativeness</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Belnap</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Inferentialism</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Meaning</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Logical Constants</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Operational Rules</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_62337_5386765d1721d31a77e8860e28714fed.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>
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