University of Tehran Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 49 1 2016 03 20 The Critical Analysis of Davies’ Interpretation of Putnam’s Externalist Argument against Skepticism The Critical Analysis of Davies’ Interpretation of Putnam’s Externalist Argument against Skepticism 75 96 58364 10.22059/jitp.2016.58364 FA Hamid Alaeinejad PhD student, philosophy department, Tarbiat Modares University Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati Tarbiat Modares University Journal Article 2015 10 28 Skepticism about the external world is a philosophical view that claims we can’t know anything about the external world. Some kinds of philosophical skepticism use skeptical hypothesis to prove that we cannot know anything about the external world. This view has its roots in the fact that we don’t know skeptical hypothesis is wrong. Putnam hold that accepting the semantical externalism refutes this kind of skepticism about the external world. Davies has an important interpretation of Putnam’s argument against the external world skepticism. In this paper, we have logically analyzed and evaluated Davies’ semantical externalism argument against skepticism concerning the external world. The conclusion is that Davies’s argument refutes an important kind of skeptical hypothesis. By using the other kinds of skeptical hypothesis, however, the skeptics can’t conclude that it is impossible to know anything about the external world. Skepticism about the external world is a philosophical view that claims we can’t know anything about the external world. Some kinds of philosophical skepticism use skeptical hypothesis to prove that we cannot know anything about the external world. This view has its roots in the fact that we don’t know skeptical hypothesis is wrong. Putnam hold that accepting the semantical externalism refutes this kind of skepticism about the external world. Davies has an important interpretation of Putnam’s argument against the external world skepticism. In this paper, we have logically analyzed and evaluated Davies’ semantical externalism argument against skepticism concerning the external world. The conclusion is that Davies’s argument refutes an important kind of skeptical hypothesis. By using the other kinds of skeptical hypothesis, however, the skeptics can’t conclude that it is impossible to know anything about the external world. https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_58364_092ff53a13cf9e217adb69d8cd013376.pdf