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<ArticleSet>
<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>Univrsity Of Tehran Press</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophy and Kalam</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-9422</Issn>
				<Volume>49</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>20</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The Representation of Reality and Epistemic Value in Non-Certain Knowledge Based on Allameh Tabataie's Theory of Conventionality</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>The Representation of Reality and Epistemic Value in Non-Certain Knowledge Based on Allameh Tabataie&#039;s Theory of Conventionality</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>55</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>73</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">58363</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22059/jitp.2016.58363</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mahdi</FirstName>
					<LastName>Ashoori</LastName>
<Affiliation>Iranian Institue of philosophy, PHD Student</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>AbdolHosein</FirstName>
					<LastName>Khosropanah</LastName>
<Affiliation>Professor, Institute of Islamic Culture and Thought (IICT</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2015</Year>
					<Month>10</Month>
					<Day>05</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>In Islamic philosophy non-certain beliefs are not knowledge but Ignorance, and arguments for the validity of &quot;confidence&quot; in the Science of Usul al-Fiqh only prove its pragmatic value; The question is whether or not non-certain opinions have epistemic values? In this article, we reconstruct the theory of “conventional perceptions” and divide the &quot;mental existence&quot; to &quot;inherent mental existence&quot; and &quot;conventional mental existence&quot;, and then we explain some conventional ideas can represent the facts. Conventional perception represents reality, if it relies on the inherent perception; otherwise, this convention is arbitrary. This link is the source of representation in conventional perceptions and the source of partial truth in non-certain knowledge; but we cannot determine directly this source, and in non-certain knowledge the criterion of evaluation does not rely on the criterion of representation.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">In Islamic philosophy non-certain beliefs are not knowledge but Ignorance, and arguments for the validity of &quot;confidence&quot; in the Science of Usul al-Fiqh only prove its pragmatic value; The question is whether or not non-certain opinions have epistemic values? In this article, we reconstruct the theory of “conventional perceptions” and divide the &quot;mental existence&quot; to &quot;inherent mental existence&quot; and &quot;conventional mental existence&quot;, and then we explain some conventional ideas can represent the facts. Conventional perception represents reality, if it relies on the inherent perception; otherwise, this convention is arbitrary. This link is the source of representation in conventional perceptions and the source of partial truth in non-certain knowledge; but we cannot determine directly this source, and in non-certain knowledge the criterion of evaluation does not rely on the criterion of representation.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Representation of Reality</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Epistemic Value</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Non-Certain Knowledge</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Conventional Perceptions</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_58363_4ee1f0d498ee727dcdb5b454f82bc06c.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>
</ArticleSet>
