Univrsity Of Tehran Press Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 58 2 2026 02 02 The Unconditioned Condition of Consciousness: Avicenna on the Nature of “Self-Awareness” The Unconditioned Condition of Consciousness: Avicenna on the Nature of “Self-Awareness” 371 388 105788 10.22059/jitp.2025.394421.523605 FA Sajad Amirkhani Shahraki Lecturer and researcher in Islamic philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland. Journal Article 2025 04 30 This article examines Avicenna’s doctrine of shuʿūr bi-dhāt, or “self-awareness,” and argues that, because it is unmediated by forms or cognitive faculties, this awareness is not of the order of conceptual or representational knowledge. Consequently, shuʿūr bi-dhāt must be distinguished from various forms of self-knowledge that rely on conceptual cognition. According to Avicenna, this awareness possesses three essential features: actuality, permanence, and immediacy. He regards shuʿūr bi-dhāt as the condition for the possibility of every other act of cognition and awareness, since in every judgment—even those whose subject is “I”—the agent is already and pre-reflectively aware that it is he himself who makes the judgment. For this reason, self-awareness, for Avicenna, is axiomatic, a priori, and independent of any other form of cognition: while it constitutes the necessary ground of all awareness, it is itself grounded in nothing beyond itself. Thus, shuʿūr bi-dhāt can be understood as a kind of non-conceptual, a priori awareness that is the unconditioned condition of every other consciousness. This doctrine of self-awareness, though partially resonant with certain analytic-philosophical accounts, is identical with none of them. This article examines Avicenna’s doctrine of shuʿūr bi-dhāt, or “self-awareness,” and argues that, because it is unmediated by forms or cognitive faculties, this awareness is not of the order of conceptual or representational knowledge. Consequently, shuʿūr bi-dhāt must be distinguished from various forms of self-knowledge that rely on conceptual cognition. According to Avicenna, this awareness possesses three essential features: actuality, permanence, and immediacy. He regards shuʿūr bi-dhāt as the condition for the possibility of every other act of cognition and awareness, since in every judgment—even those whose subject is “I”—the agent is already and pre-reflectively aware that it is he himself who makes the judgment. For this reason, self-awareness, for Avicenna, is axiomatic, a priori, and independent of any other form of cognition: while it constitutes the necessary ground of all awareness, it is itself grounded in nothing beyond itself. Thus, shuʿūr bi-dhāt can be understood as a kind of non-conceptual, a priori awareness that is the unconditioned condition of every other consciousness. This doctrine of self-awareness, though partially resonant with certain analytic-philosophical accounts, is identical with none of them.

https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_105788_7b0fc9bdfa005af97b3389fa48e0b542.pdf