Univrsity Of Tehran Press Philosophy and Kalam 2008-9422 57 2 2025 02 18 A Critique of William Rowe’s Perspective on the “Begging the Question” Nature of the Modal Ontological Argument A Critique of William Rowe’s Perspective on the “Begging the Question” Nature of the Modal Ontological Argument 497 513 100762 10.22059/jitp.2024.378216.523518 FA Mohammadamin Khodamoradi MA Student, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2024 06 18 This research investigates and critiques William Rowe’s objection to Plantinga’s modal ontological argument using a descriptive-analytical approach. According to Plantinga, God is defined as a maximally great being—a being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent in all possible worlds. Plantinga’s argument holds that, since the existence of such a being is possible, it must follow that this being exists in the actual world. The key premise of this argument, known as the "possibility premise," asserts that God's existence is not impossible. William Rowe argues that Plantinga’s argument epistemologically commits the fallacy of "begging the question." Rowe claims that the only way to affirm the possibility premise—the possibility of God’s existence—is by already accepting the conclusion that God exists in the actual world. This research provides a detailed analysis of Rowe’s objection and argues that his claim—that the modal ontological argument begs the question—is inconsistent with his own criteria for identifying this fallacy. Furthermore, as some of Rowe’s critics have pointed out, his reasoning would imply that all valid arguments are guilty of begging the question, which is evidently false. Consequently, Rowe fails to demonstrate that the modal ontological argument commits the fallacy of begging the question. This research investigates and critiques William Rowe’s objection to Plantinga’s modal ontological argument using a descriptive-analytical approach. According to Plantinga, God is defined as a maximally great being—a being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent in all possible worlds. Plantinga’s argument holds that, since the existence of such a being is possible, it must follow that this being exists in the actual world. The key premise of this argument, known as the "possibility premise," asserts that God's existence is not impossible. William Rowe argues that Plantinga’s argument epistemologically commits the fallacy of "begging the question." Rowe claims that the only way to affirm the possibility premise—the possibility of God’s existence—is by already accepting the conclusion that God exists in the actual world. This research provides a detailed analysis of Rowe’s objection and argues that his claim—that the modal ontological argument begs the question—is inconsistent with his own criteria for identifying this fallacy. Furthermore, as some of Rowe’s critics have pointed out, his reasoning would imply that all valid arguments are guilty of begging the question, which is evidently false. Consequently, Rowe fails to demonstrate that the modal ontological argument commits the fallacy of begging the question. https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_100762_fc9abb4d76f971515c6a7880f0a57535.pdf