TY - JOUR ID - 29434 TI - Zagzebski’s Criticism of Plantinga’s Theory of Proper Function JO - Philosophy and Kalam JA - JITP LA - en SN - 2008-9422 AU - Nazarnejad, Narges AD - Y1 - 2013 PY - 2013 VL - 45 IS - 2 SP - 165 EP - 191 KW - Alvin Plantinga KW - Linda Zagzebski KW - Theory of proper function KW - Virtue-epistemology DO - 10.22059/jitp.2013.29434 N2 - The present essay is a critical study of Zagzebski’s reading and criticism of Plantinga’s virtue-epistemology. Zagzebski, on the account of her definition of knowledge and the role that she assigns to ‘volition’ and ‘awareness’ in virtuous acts, along with her acceptance of the uniformity of moral and epistemic virtue, challenges Plantinga’s theory of Knowledge. Zagzebski believes that although Plantinga’s theory of Proper Function is better than Straight Reliabilism and that it is possible to interpret it in a way that is analogous to her own theory of Knowledge and even the fact that its calling virtue-epistemology seems appropriate, yet taking into account Plantinga’s epistemological presuppositions and his mechanistic picture of the theory of Knowledge, his theory of Proper Function owing to its disregard for the elements of volition and awareness, in the final analysis, cannot be considered as a type of virtue-epistemology. UR - https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_29434.html L1 - https://jitp.ut.ac.ir/article_29434_f4004a17adbd5d9ce1eb36cb8b9edd47.pdf ER -